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Trafficking and the Shallow State
Julie Dahlstrom*
More than two decades ago, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA)
established new, robust protections for immigrant victims of trafficking. In particular,
Congress created the T visa, a special form of immigration status, to protect immigrant victims
from deportation. Despite lofty ambitions, the annual cap of 5,000 T visas has never been
reached, with fewer than 1,200 approved each year. In recent years, denial rates also have
climbed. For example, in fiscal year 2020, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services denied
42.79% of the T visa applications that the agency adjudicated, compared with just 28.12%
in fiscal year 2015. These developments came as former president Donald J. Trump
proclaimed a deep commitment to end the “epidemic” of human trafficking and to protect
“innocent” victims.
Though scholars have critiqued the general protection framework for immigrant victims
of trafficking, this Article unearths an understudied problem: the often-unseen role of the
“shallow state.” In contrast to the much-discussed “deep state” of career bureaucrats, this
Article suggests that low-level administrative actors adjudicating humanitarian immigration
cases have subtly worked to undermine protections for immigrant victims of trafficking. This
Article demonstrates how administrative actors through a range of tactics, including delay,
rejection, and heightened stakes, have contorted the T visa application process to make it more
difficult for immigrant victims to navigate. The Article explores how these actions—often
diffuse and obscured—have been hard to identify and subject to judicial review. It warns that
these bureaucratic tendencies have resulted in declining approval rates with the potential to
erode protections for immigrant victims of trafficking for years to come. It, thus, prescribes not
only greater attention to such practices but also administrative and judicial remedies.

* Clinical Associate Professor and Director of the Immigrants’ Rights and Human Trafficking Program,
Boston University School of Law. Many thanks to Jane Aiken, Cori Alonso-Yoder, Warren Binford,
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your insightful comments. I greatly appreciate the feedback received from the NYU Clinical Law
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INTRODUCTION
To mark the twentieth anniversary of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
(TVPA), former president Donald J. Trump hosted a White House Summit on
Human Trafficking.1 He announced unequivocally: “My administration is 100
percent committed to eradicating human trafficking from the Earth.”2 He reminded
the audience that “[w]e’ve had a tremendous track record—the best track record in
a long time.”3 He then proudly proclaimed how his administration had passed nine
pieces of anti-trafficking legislation, authorized $430 million to fight trafficking,
and withheld foreign aid from countries that failed to sufficiently fight trafficking.4
President Trump’s summit was not simply a public relations stunt. The Trump
administration, like many Republican and Democratic administrations before it, has
repeatedly insisted that ending human trafficking was a major foreign policy priority
and committed to protect “innocent” victims.5 In fact, President Trump gained
1. Remarks by President Trump at the White House Summit on Human Trafficking: The 20th
Anniversary of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, WHITE HOUSE ( Jan. 31, 2020, 12:21 PM)
[hereinafter White House Summit], https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/
remarks-president-trump-white-house-summit-human-trafficking-20th-anniversary-trafficking-victims
-protection-act-2000/ [ https://perma.cc/25HX-4E62 ].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., The Trump Administration Is Committed to Combating Human Trafficking and
Protecting the Innocent, TRUMP WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/trump-administration-committed-combating-human-trafficking-protecting-
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notoriety when he controversially proclaimed that trafficking is “worse than ever
before”6 and promised to bring the full force of the U.S. government to bear on the
problem.7 He accomplished this objective often in a rather cynical, Machiavellian
way, by using the rhetoric of human trafficking to justify broad executive actions
aimed at immigration enforcement.8 When advocates opined that these efforts

innocent/ [ https://perma.cc/FZ2F-GCG5 ] (statement of President Trump) (“We renew our resolve
to redouble our efforts to deliver justice to all who contribute to the cruelty of human trafficking, and
will tenaciously pursue the promise of freedom for all victims of this terrible crime.”); see also Remarks
in a Meeting on Human Trafficking at the Mexico-United States Border and an Exchange With
Reporters, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. (Feb. 1, 2019); White House Summit, supra note 1; Rebecca
Ballhaus, Trump Strengthens Efforts Against Human Trafficking, Amid Criticism from Victims’ Advocates,
WALL ST. J. ( Jan. 31, 2020, 1:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-strengthens-effortsagainst-human-trafficking-amid-criticism-from-victims-advocates-11580482657 [ https://perma.cc/
Y3U6-TRVL ] (quoting President Trump, who proclaimed that his administration “will not rest until
we’ve stopped every last human trafficker and liberated every last survivor”).
6. White House Summit, supra note 1. President Trump’s statement that trafficking was “worse”
than ever before was heavily criticized by scholars and activists who remarked that there is no evidence
to support this assertion. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, Trump Says Human Trafficking ‘Is Worse than It’s Ever
Been in the History of the World.’ Where to Begin?, WASH. POST (April 19, 2018, 12:19 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/04/19/trump-says-human-trafficking-is-worsethan-its-ever-been-in-the-history-of-the-world-where-to-even-begin/
[ https://perma.cc/VXB4KDXN ] (“It seems this is one of those facts that nobody else knew—because it’s not true.”); Daniella
Diaz, Trump Says Human Trafficking Is ‘Worse Now than It Ever Was,’ CNN ( July 28, 2017, 7:24 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/28/politics/donald-trump-human-trafficking/index.html [ https://
perma.cc/JU5K-TYSR ] (citing to statistics related to African slavery to argue that, while human
trafficking is a serious problem, it is certainly not “worse” than it has ever been).
7. President Donald J. Trump Has Made It A Priority to Combat the Heinous Crime of Human
Trafficking, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
president-donald-j-trump-made-priority-combat-heinous-crime-human-trafficking/
[ https://
perma.cc/6D4C-YM6G ] (“My Administration is committed to leveraging every resource we have to
confront this threat, to support the victims and survivors, and to hold traffickers accountable for their
heinous crimes.”).
8. President Trump used trafficking as a justification for wide-scale immigration enforcement
efforts, which had the impact of separating hundreds of immigrant families, criminally prosecuting
immigrants who entered the country unlawfully, and dismantling asylum protections. See, e.g., Julie
Dahlstrom, The Elastic Meaning(s) of Human Trafficking, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 379, 433 (2020) (citing
Attorney General Sessions Addresses Recent Criticisms of Zero Tolerance by Church Leaders, U.S. DEP’T
JUST. ( June 14, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorneygeneral-sessions-addressesrecent-criticisms-zero-tolerance-church-leaders [ https://perma.cc/FTP2- A7BN ]) (examining how
President Trump used trafficking as a sword to fuel immigration enforcement efforts with serious
collateral consequences).
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would imperil protections for immigrant victims,9 he reassured
victims: “You are not alone.”10
Yet immigrant victims of human trafficking in the United States had never felt
so alone. Prominent anti-trafficking advocates boycotted the White House Summit
on Human Trafficking.11 They called President Trump’s anti-trafficking rhetoric a
“public deception.”12 Advocates pointed to rising denial rates for T visas, a

9. This Article uses the term “victim” throughout because it is a term of legal significance. Many
have argued that the term “victim” is problematic, as it characterizes individuals by weakness or
passivity, rather than by strength or courage, and prefer the term “survivor.” See, e.g., Martha Minow,
Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1432 (1993) (“Victimhood is a cramped identity,
depending on and reinforcing the faulty idea that a person can be reduced to a trait. The victim is
helpless, decimated, pathetic, weak, and ignorant. Departing from this script may mean losing whatever
entitlements and compassion victim status may afford.”); Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real
Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 157, 160 (2007)
(discussing the iconic trafficking victim as “meek, passive objects of sexual exploitation . . . exercising
no free will during their illegal entry” and suggesting this rhetoric has become a myth to lawmakers and
law enforcement agents). However, this Article uses the term “victim” in place of “survivor” because
it is a legal term of art that triggers access to important protections, including but not limited to
immigration status, public benefits, civil damages, and criminal restitution. See Amanda Peters,
Reconsidering Federal and State Obstacles to Human Trafficking Victim Status and Entitlements, UTAH
L. REV. 535, 539 (2016) (“In the human trafficking context, victims receive much more than mere
attention by wearing the label [of victim]; they earn legal rights, services, benefits, and freedom from
criminal charges.”).
10. Trump to Trafficking Victims: You Are Not Alone, CNN (Apr. 11, 2018), https://
www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2018/04/11/trump-signs-sex-trafficking-act.cnn [ https://perma.cc/
4DT2-ECU8 ].
11. See, e.g., Jessica Contrera, Anti-Human-Trafficking Groups Refuse To Attend Ivanka Trump’s
White House Summit, WASH. POST ( Jan. 30, 2020, 6:50 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/human-trafficking-groups-refuse-to-attend-ivanka-trumps-white-house-summit/2020/01/29/6
410de32-41d4-11ea-b503-2b077c436617_story.html [ https://perma.cc/B9WR-MJ6E ]; Katie Rogers,
White House Holds Trafficking ‘Summit,’ but Critics Dismiss Lack of Dialogue, N.Y. TIMES
( Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/us/politics/trump-trafficking.html [ https://
perma.cc/5WX6-VH83 ] (“[T]he White House event, which lasted the better part of two hours, did
nothing to ease the concerns of activists who have said the administration’s previous efforts on the
issue have harmed some of those seeking help.”).
12. Contrera, supra note 11. Advocates criticized the White House for leveraging anti-trafficking
rhetoric to justify immigration enforcement efforts while “abandon[ing] actual survivors of trafficking
when they need immigration relief themselves.” See, e.g., Melissa Gira Grant, The Trump Administration
Finally Broke the Anti-Trafficking Movement, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 18, 2020), https://
newrepublic.com/article/156579/trump-administration-finally-broke-anti-trafficking-movement
[ https://perma.cc/92B7-GBNY ] (“While the Trump administration uses a sensationalistic, false
narrative of trafficking at the southern border to justify anti-immigrant policies—and stoke racist panic
among Trump’s base about threats to white women—it has abandoned actual survivors of trafficking
when they need immigration relief themselves.”). As Trump intensified immigration enforcement
efforts, many scholars and activists expressed alarm that immigrant victims of trafficking were caught
in the crosshairs, targeted with deportation or rendered more vulnerable to trafficking. See Susan
Tiefenbrun, The Saga of Susannah, A U.S. Remedy for Sex Trafficking in Women: The Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2002, UTAH L. REV. 107, 114 (2002) (“[I]mmigration laws
that are zealously enforced in the destination countries in an effort to protect victims often have a
negative effect on the very victims they seek to protect by requiring their deportation.”); Julie
Dahlstrom, Opinion, Trump’s Harsh Immigration Policies Are a Gift for Human Traffickers, HILL ( July
12, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/396781-trumps-harsh-immigration-
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specialized form of immigration relief for trafficking victims. They also highlighted
new, significant barriers that immigrant victims faced when applying for
immigration benefits.13 As Martina Vandenberg, founder of the Human Trafficking
Legal Center, remarked, “We have such a chasm between rhetoric and reality” as
the Executive has “undermin[ed] protections carefully built for trafficking victims
over two decades.”14
The legislative landscape seemed protective. Over two decades ago, Congress
recognized the unique challenges faced by immigrant victims of trafficking by
passing novel federal anti-trafficking legislation. In the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000, Congress noted that instead of finding refuge,
immigrant victims “are repeatedly punished more harshly than the traffickers
themselves.”15 Congress acknowledged that immigrant victims often found
themselves subject to both criminal penalties and harsh immigration enforcement
efforts.16 Thus, legislators embraced the need to “protect[ ] rather than punish[ ]”
trafficking victims17 and established specialized immigration protections, including
T visas,18 U visas,19 and Continued Presence.20
Since 2000, however, annual T visa approvals for immigrant victims have
remained dismally low.21 Despite a cap of 5,000 available annually, fewer than 1,100
policies-are-a-gift-for-human-traffickers [ https://perma.cc/AT7S-V8P9 ] (describing how immigration
enforcement efforts under the Trump administration have rendered immigrant victims
more vulnerable).
13. Advocates observed that many immigrant victims, afraid of deportation and/or reprisals
from traffickers, were unable to step forward to cooperate with law enforcement or to apply for
significant immigration protections. See Abigail Abrams, ‘I Thought I Was Going to Die.’ How Donald
Trump’s Immigration Agenda Set Back the Clock on Fighting Human Trafficking, TIME (Oct. 30,
2020, 10:41 AM), https://time.com/5905437/human-trafficking-trump-administration/ [ https://
perma.cc/DL35-9Y3Q ].
14. Contrera, supra note 11.
15. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
§ 102(b)(17), 114 Stat. 1464, 1468.
16. See id.
17. § 102(b)(24), 114 Stat. at 1469.
18. T nonimmigrant status has been called colloquially “T visas.” For consistency, this Article
refers to T nonimmigrant status throughout this Article as a “T visa,” and U nonimmigrant status for
victims of violent crime as a “U visa.” For a discussion of the requirements to qualify for T visas, see
infra Section I.C. This Article focuses exclusively on T-1 visas, which are available to victims of a “severe
form of trafficking,” rather than derivative T visas. Therefore, this Article uses “T visa” to refer to
T-1 visas, unless otherwise noted.
19. For a discussion of the requirements to qualify for U visas, see infra Section I.C.
20. For a discussion about Continued Presence, see infra Section I.C.
21. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., NUMBER OF FORM I-914, APPLICATION FOR T
NONIMMIGRANT STATUS BY FISCAL YEAR, QUARTER, AND CASE STATUS: FISCAL YEARS 2008–2020
(2020),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/reports/I914t_visastatistics_fy2020
_qtr4.pdf [ https://perma.cc/49U3-AKK3 ] [ hereinafter USCIS STATISTICS ]; U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGR. SERVS., FORM 1-914 - APPLICATION FOR T NONIMMIGRANT STATUS, FORM I-918
PETITION FOR U NONIMMIGRANT STATUS VISA, SERVICE-WIDE RECEIPTS, APPROVALS, AND
DENIALS, FISCAL YEARS: 2002 THROUGH 2013 (NOVEMBER 2012) (2013), https://www.uscis.
gov/sites/default/files/document/data/I914T-I918_visastatistics_2012-nov.pdf [ https://perma.cc/
CPP7-N8BD ]. When referencing approval and denial rates for T visas, this Article refers to USCIS data
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T visas have been approved annually.22 Moreover, T visa denial rates climbed
dramatically in the last five years.23 In fiscal year 2020, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) denied 42.79% of all T visa applications adjudicated
that year, compared with 28.12% in fiscal year 2015.24 At the same time, processing
times for T visas have skyrocketed with more applicants receiving denials and
requests for additional evidence.25
These trends have had a significant impact on immigrant victims.26 As Martina
Vandenberg explained, “Trafficking victims are living in terror.”27 Emelia, an
immigrant victim of sex trafficking, applied for a T visa after a decade of silence
and fear.28 USCIS, the agency that adjudicates T visa cases, issued a denial notice to
her, stating that it “is sensitive to what you have been through and acknowledges
the help you have received in relation to your trafficking situation.”29 Nonetheless,
USCIS denied Emelia’s claim, claiming that her current presence in the United
States was unrelated to the trafficking.30 This finding came despite evidence of
significant trauma and the need for ongoing mental health treatment to heal.31
Emelia’s story is not an outlier. During the first three months of 2020 when
Emelia’s case was decided, USCIS denied 50.00% of all T visa cases it adjudicated.32
These denials included cases of labor and sex trafficking. For example, USCIS also

in USCIS STATISTICS, specifically the column entitled “[v]ictims of [t]rafficking,” which provides the
number of applications approved, denied, and pending. All approval or denial rates reference
applications decided during the fiscal year, rather than applications received in a given year. See USCIS
STATISTICS, supra.
22. The only fiscal year that T visa approvals for victims of trafficking (not derivative family
members) exceeded one thousand was in 2020. See USCIS STATISTICS, supra note 21.
23. See id.
24. See id. The author has calculated the approval rates in this Article as the number of “[v]ictims
of [t]rafficking” with “approved” applications divided by the sum of the number of “victims of
trafficking with “approved” and “denied” applications.
25. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 518 (2020), https://
www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020-TIP-Report-Complete-062420-FINAL.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/3TAH-L288 ] [ hereinafter 2020 TIP REPORT ] (“Advocates noted a continuing rise
in the number of requests for additional evidence by adjudicators, which tends to increase processing
times, and reported increased T visa denials that they believed improperly interpreted relevant statutes
and regulations . . . .”).
26. See Abrams, supra note 13 (describing a victim who “because of delays seemingly designed
to deter new T visa applications and reduce the total number offered each year . . . finds herself in a
prolonged legal purgatory”).
27. Id. (quoting Martina Vandenberg) (“The Trump Administration’s immigration policies have
made foreign trafficking victims’ lives more dangerous. Those policies have made it more difficult to
escape. And those policies have made it more difficult to obtain relief.”).
28. This case is based on a client represented by the BU Law Immigrants’ Rights and Human
Trafficking Program. The name has been changed to protect client confidentiality, and the client has
consented to the use of her information in this Article.
29. Redacted Letter from Laura B. Zuchowski, Dir. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., to
Emelia (2020) (on file with author) (denying I-914, Application for T Nonimmigrant Status).
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. See USCIS STATISTICS, supra note 21.
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denied the T visa application of a Peruvian immigrant, known only as Jane Doe in
federal pleadings.33 Doe, an immigrant victim of labor trafficking, was recruited as
a child to work in the United States, but upon arrival, her employers took her
passport, paid her only $100 per month, and made her work long hours with no
days off.34 Doe’s T visa was denied, and she was placed in removal proceedings.35
Desperate to prevent her own deportation, Doe filed a federal lawsuit against
USCIS, challenging the agency’s actions as “arbitrary and capricious.”36 Mercer
Cauley, Doe’s attorney, explained, “Basically the government has told her, ‘Yes, you
are a victim of trafficking, but we’re going to deport you anyway.’”37
This Article examines why legislative efforts aimed at protection for immigrant
victims of human trafficking are failing. Scholars have offered various explanations
for low T visa numbers.38 Some have observed how victims, especially those
without legal representation, find it challenging to navigate the burdensome T visa
requirements.39 Others have tied low approval rates to a flawed federal framework
33. Complaint at 6, Doe v. Wolf, No. 3:20-cv-00481 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2020).
34. Id. at 11.
35. Michael Gordon, Lured to U.S. at 16, She Sought Visa for Trafficking Victims. Now She
May Be Deported., CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Sept. 12, 2020), https://greensboro.com/news/state/
lured-to-u-s-at-16-she-sought-visa-for-trafficking-victims-now-she-may/article_da47ff06-f456-11eaa9c7-f3babaebdd19.html [ https://perma.cc/5E39-Y75B ].
36. Complaint, supra note 33, at 4.
37. Gordon, supra note 35.
38. See, e.g., Sabrina Balgamwalla, Jobs Looking for People, People Looking for Their
Rights: Seeking Relief for Exploited Immigrant Workers in North Dakota, 91 N.D. L. REV. 483, 494–95
(2015) (describing the challenges that victims face demonstrating they meet the T visa requirements,
including that they are a victim of a severe form of trafficking and are in the United States “on account
of” the trafficking, among other requirements); Jennifer M. Chacón, Tensions and
Trade-Offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in the Era of Immigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609
(2010) (exposing the tensions and trade-offs between immigration policy choices and anti-trafficking
efforts) [hereinafter Chacón, Tensions]; Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, The Trafficking and Exploitation
Victims Assistance Program: A Proposed Early Response Plan for Victims of International Human
Trafficking in the United States, 38 N.M. L. REV. 373, 376 (2008) (pointing to structural challenges in
the protection framework and “unrealistic expectations” by law enforcement about what type of
protection they can provide to immigrant victims); Dina Francesca Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a
Bed in a Brothel: Conceptual, Legal, and Procedural Failures to Fulfill the Promise of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 337, 346 (2007) (arguing that the pronounced role of law
enforcement in the T visa process has reduced the effectiveness of immigration protections for victims);
Srikantiah, supra note 9 (arguing that agency regulations have narrowed T visa availability by focusing
on prosecutorial goals of the “iconic victim”).
39. See NAT'L INST. OF JUST. & OFF. FOR ACCESS TO JUST., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. WITH NAT'L
SCI. FOUND., WHITE HOUSE LEGAL AID INTERAGENCY ROUND TABLE: CIVIL LEGAL AID
RESEARCH WORKSHOP REPORT 21–22 (2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249776.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/6R3A-PX6T ] (highlighting the challenges faced by victims when accessing legal aid
and recommending more research dedicated to pro bono representation and outcomes); OFF. FOR
VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OVC FACT SHEET: THE LEGAL RIGHTS AND NEEDS OF
VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES (2015), https://ovc.ojp.gov/
sites/g/files/xyckuh226/files/media/document/HT_Legal_Rights_Needs_fact_sheet-508.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/X43X-UQKZ ] (describing significant unmet legal needs for victims of trafficking);
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ET AL., FEDERAL STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN ON SERVICES FOR VICTIMS OF
HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013–2017 (2014), https://ovc.ojp.gov/sites/g/
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that prioritizes prosecution over victim protection.40 More generally, scholars have
observed how the existing statutory framework allows racialized and gendered
narratives about “rescue” and “escape” to shape who is deserving of relief.41
This Article argues that these critiques, while important and correct, do not
adequately explain declining T visa approvals. It posits that the actions of
administrative actors at USCIS in the “shallow state” have played a formative role
in curtailing protections.42 While much scholarly attention has focused on the “deep
state” and acts of bureaucratic resistance,43 this Article examines a more subtle
phenomenon: the workings of the often-silent shallow state.44 Whereas the deep
state is characterized by career bureaucrats who resist the executive, the shallow
state involves low-level bureaucratic actors who work in concert with the executive.
They act in service of an often hidden executive agenda, one which if promulgated
through more formal mechanisms such as rulemaking or legislation would spark a
public outcry or legal challenges. Through obscure, often superficial methods, these
bureaucratic actors work to impede access to benefits and to avoid legal and
political conflict.
This Article traces the actions of the shallow state in the T visa context under
the Trump administration. It shows how members of the shallow state enacted
diverse, diffuse policies to establish new barriers within the T visa application
process.45 As an example, in a new policy, USCIS in 2018 began to place all denied

files/xyckuh226/files/media/document/FederalHumanTraffickingStrategicPlan.pdf
[ https://
perma.cc/35VZ-2SB7 ] (“While human trafficking victims may be eligible for T or U nonimmigrant
status, which allows victims to remain and work in the United States and assist law enforcement
authorities in the investigation or prosecution of human trafficking cases, many victims continue to
face legal constraints challenging their recovery process.”).
40. See, e.g., Balgamwalla, supra note 38, at 494 (describing how law enforcement’s “gendered
portrayals of trafficking” is a barrier for victims of trafficking and failed efforts to identify trafficking
victims can result in incarceration or deportation); Cianciarulo, supra note 38 at 388 (arguing that the
requirement that victims of trafficking cooperate with law enforcement “expos[es] the [human
trafficking] victims to the skepticism and enforcement mentality of law enforcement officials [that] has
proven antithetical to the goals of the T visa”); Srikantiah, supra note 9, at 160 (“On a structural level,
agency regulations place the responsibility of identifying trafficking victims and assessing victims’
cooperation with law enforcement in the hands of prosecutors and agents responsible for
investigating traffickers.”).
41. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts
to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 3022–23 (2006) [ hereinafter Chacón, Misery ]
(asserting that the TVPA’s “unwillingness to extend protections to ‘illegal workers’ absent a showing
of their ‘innocence’ embeds into the TVPA the same immigration and labor law policies that have
created a haven for trafficking and migrant exploitation”); Haynes, supra note 38, at 346
(“[G]overnment officials appear to subscribe to several myths and imperfect syllogistic reasoning which
prevent them from seeing a victim when he or she is standing in front of them.”).
42. See infra Part II.
43. See infra Section II.B.
44. See David Rothkopf, The Shallow State, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 22, 2017, 1:01 PM), https://
foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/22/the-shallow-state-trump/ [ https://perma.cc/2T53-N4CK ]. See infra
Part II for a greater discussion of the shallow state.
45. Editorial Board, Opinion, Trump’s Immigration Policies Are Straight Out of Dystopian
Fiction, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-
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T visa applicants immediately in removal (i.e., deportation) proceedings.46 Contrary
to over a decade of practice, this policy had an immediate chilling effect by raising
the stakes for immigrant victims and discouraging them from filing new T visa
applications.47 Meanwhile, quickly and with little notice, the agency tightened fee
waiver standards, raised fees, and summarily rejected new applications that failed to
comply with new fee standards.48 Around the same time, a simple online alert
announced that USCIS would summarily reject T visa applications if even a single
field was left blank.49 USCIS simultaneously began to issue more requests for
additional evidence and denials to T visa applicants.50 This trend came despite the
fact that trafficking victims often lacked corroborative evidence and that existing
regulations required only that immigrant victims present “credible evidence” to
meet certain requirements.51 In the interim, processing times for T visas ballooned
from 7.9 months in 2016 to 2.4 years in 2020.52 These delays meant that immigrant
victims had to wait, most without legal status, for more than two years—some only
to find their applications denied.
This Article argues that these disparate policies worked in concert to create
“minefields”53 in the T visa application process and to frustrate the purpose of
federal anti-trafficking law.54 It is true that many of these same policies impacted
other types of immigration applications and with devastating consequences. Yet,
this Article focuses its attention on the T visa context to provide an example of the

immigration-policies-are-straight-out-of-dystopian-fiction/2020/02/20/4c335dfa-5361-11ea-b1194faabac6674f_story.html [ https://perma.cc/D27F-G5HL ] [ hereinafter Dystopian Fiction ] (“Other
moves, just as or more effective, are bureaucratic booby traps laid in arcane procedural byways.”).
46. See infra Section II.D.1 for a detailed discussion of this policy. This policy also applied to
applicants for U visas who were victims of crime.
47. Id.
48. See infra Section II.D.2 regarding the fee waiver and “no spaces” policy.
49. See Catherine Rampell, Opinion, This Latest Trick from the Trump Administration Is One of
the Most Despicable Yet, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2020, 4:24 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/the-trump-administrations-kafkaesque-new-way-to-thwart-visa-applications/2020/02/13/
190a3862-4ea3-11ea-bf44-f5043eb3918a_story.html [ https://perma.cc/86C7-45R3 ] (“The policy
change, at first affecting just asylum applicants, was announced without fanfare on the USCIS website
sometime in the fall.”).
50. See 2020 TIP REPORT, supra note 25, at 518.
51. See 8 C.F.R § 214.11(d)(2)(i) (2020) (“An application for T nonimmigrant status must
include. . . [a]ny credible evidence that the applicant would like USCIS to consider supporting any of
the eligibility requirements set out in paragraphs (f), (g), (h) and (i) of this section.”).
52. Abrams, supra note 13.
53. See Dystopian Fiction, supra note 45 (describing administrative policies to make government
forms “minefields, intentionally designed to entrap the unsuspecting”); Rampell, supra note 49.
54. An October 2020 report to members of Congress called attention to the “underutilization”
of the T visa program. ABIGAIL F. KOLKER & KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46584,
IMMIGRATION RELIEF FOR VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING 12 (2020) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION RELIEF
FOR VICTIMS], https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46584 [ https://perma.cc/3SPVZE6Q ] (documenting the failure of T visa approvals to reach the cap of 5,000 and encouraging
policymakers to “look at factors that potentially contribute to what some observers consider to be
underutilization of [T nonimmigrant] status”).
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impact that administrative actors can have on one vulnerable
population—immigrant victims of trafficking.
Part I examines the evolution of U.S. federal law regarding human trafficking
and immigrant victims. It explores how Congress first conceptualized criminal and
immigration enforcement responses. Part I shows how, prior to the TVPA,
immigrant victims remained unprotected and subject to harsh immigration
measures. It then describes contemporary congressional efforts to remedy this
problem by defining new trafficking crimes and establishing more robust
immigration protections. Part I then demonstrates how these specialized
immigration benefits have remained insufficient.
Part II introduces the concept of the shallow state. It examines how
administrative actors, particularly at USCIS, have significantly curtailed statutory
protections for immigrant victims. It catalogs the tactics employed by USCIS
officials in the T visa context and shows how low-level bureaucratic officials have
transformed outcomes for immigrant victims. It also examines how plaintiffs have
effectively challenged these policies through federal litigation.
Part III then provides recommendations to guide future efforts to improve
adjudications of T visa applications and address harms caused by the shallow state.
This Part argues that existing immigration protections can still function well if there
is sufficient agency and judicial review, oversight, training, and accountability.
I. CONTEMPORARY SOLUTIONS FOR IMMIGRANT VICTIMS
A. Early Tools to Address Human Trafficking
Congress has long been concerned with human trafficking involving
immigrant victims. Early congressional action, however, focused on criminal and
immigration enforcement, rather than protection efforts.55 In the early twentieth
century, Congress, motivated in part by nativist impulses to curtail rising
immigration, sought to levy new criminal penalties against perpetrators of sex
trafficking.56 Instead of a protection framework for immigrant victims, Congress
instead engaged in racialized and gendered immigration enforcement efforts, often
intended to expel or deport immigrants.57 These measures exposed the need for a
broad protection framework, which Congress would not enact until 2000.58

55. See generally Ann Wagner & Rachel Wagley McCann, Prostitutes or Prey? The Evolution of
Congressional Intent in Combating Sex Trafficking, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 17, 28–45 (2017) (describing
the historical evolution of laws related to sex trafficking).
56. See id.
57. See, e.g., Chacón, Misery, supra note 41, at 2980–81 (2006) (“As before, current
anti-trafficking efforts are characterized by: the presumptive criminality of migrants; a willingness to
sacrifice the protection of migrants in the furtherance of criminal prosecutions; a conflation of
trafficking and prostitution; a racially biased conception of trafficking; and a dogged focus on
interdiction efforts over internal enforcement and outreach.”).
58. See infra Section I.C.

Clean Final Edit_Dahlstrom_V3.docx (Do Not Delete)

2021]

TRAFFICKING AND THE SHALLOW STATE

11/8/21 8:12 AM

71

In the early twentieth century, Congress took aim at sex trafficking in the guise
of “white slavery.”59 Activists and politicians often drew racialized, sensationalized
portraits of the “White Slave Trade.”60 Congress often focused on the plight of
white, European women, kidnapped or forced into the sex trade, while non-white
immigrant women were targeted with harsh immigration measures.61 For example,
in the late nineteenth century, Congress largely viewed Chinese immigrant women
as “immoral[]” and deviant; as a result, legislators constructed regulatory and
enforcement schemes to limit Chinese female immigration into the United States.62
In fact, the very first federal immigration law, the Page Act, targeted many Chinese
women with exclusion from the United States based on a mere suspicion of
involvement in commercial sex.63
Immigration law slowly evolved to embody even more restrictive tendencies.64
Indeed, Congress passed immigration measures in 1903 and 1907 targeting those

59. See, e.g., Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 131 (describing how the First Congress of the
International Abolitionist Federation generated awareness of white slavery in 1877).
60. The term, “White Slave Trade,” is a heavily racialized term, focusing on the trafficking of
White, predominantly Eastern European women, as distinguished from African slavery. See, e.g., Jean
Allain, White Slave Traffic in International Law, 1 J. TRAFFICKING & HUM. EXPLOITATION 1, 3, 6
(2017) (examining the international origins of the fight against “white slave traffic” at the 1902
International Conference on the White Slave Traffic). Historians have pointed to early criminal cases
in the twentieth century of “white slavery” as powerful proof of its existence. See, e.g., RUTH ROSEN,
THE LOST SISTERHOOD: PROSTITUTION IN AMERICA, 1900–1918, at 127–35 (1982). Some scholars
have argued that the concept of “white slavery” was exaggerated and mobilized instrumentally by early
reformers to address a range of social issues. See, e.g., BRIAN DONOVAN, WHITE SLAVE
CRUSADES: RACE, GENDER, AND ANTI-VICE ACTIVISM, 1887–1917, at 16 (2006) (examining how
“[t]he white slavery genre provided a touchstone for a new set of racial and gender projects”); BARBARA
MEIL HOBSON, UNEASY VIRTUE: THE POLITICS OF PROSTITUTION AND THE AMERICAN REFORM
TRADITION 140, 174 (1987) (arguing that “white slavery” was a rhetorical manifestation of concerns
with a range of social issues, including economic inequality, “local government and police corruption
from commerce,” “the spread of venereal disease,” and emerging views about the evolving sexuality
of women).
61. See, e.g., Mara L. Keire, The Vice Trust: A Reinterpretation of the White Slavery Scare in the
United States, 1907–1917, 35 J. SOC. HIST. 5, 17 (2001) (describing how at the height of the white
slavery “scare,” reformers “fought for a series of white slave traffic acts,” including the Mann Act);
Chacón, Misery, supra note 41, at 3012 (outlining early twentieth-century efforts by Congress that were
“at base, anti-immigrant measures dressed in a cloak of morality” and noting that the Page Act, in
particular, was “designed as a means of excluding Chinese immigration” using an “apparent moral
agenda”); Keire, supra (“[S]cholars have emphasized the racialized cast of the white slavery narratives,
even as they have discounted the white slavery scare as an almost Freudian manifestation of
middle-class fears about urbanization, immigration, and women’s increased mobility.”).
62. See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 641, 693 (2005).
63. An Act Supplementary to the Acts in Relation to Immigration (Page Act), ch. 141, 18
Stat. 477 (1875) (repealed 1974); see Abrams, supra note 62, at 641; Pooja R. Dadhania, Deporting
Undesirable Women, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 53, 57 (2018). This Article uses the term “commercial sex”
to refer to “any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person,”
including both tangible and intangible items. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3).
64. Congress passed “An Act To regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States” on
March 3, 1903. Immigration Act of 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-162, § 1012, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214 (criminalizing
importing individuals involved in commercial sex). On February 20, 1907, Congress revised the law in
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involved in commercial sex.65 These efforts were controversial.66 In 1910, the
Commissioner-General of Immigration opined about how, “[g]enerally virtuous
when she comes to this country,” the immigrant victim is “ruined and exploited
because there is no adequate protection and assistance.”67 However, instead of
calling for protective measures, he advocated for more “drastic”
immigration controls.68
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the White Slave Traffic Act of 1910,
commonly known as the Mann Act.69 The Mann Act created new federal criminal
jurisdiction over commercial sex but failed to establish more robust protections for
victims.70 This move, too, faced opposition. Kate Waller Barrett, a Special Agent of
the U.S. Immigration Service, was convinced that immigrant victims needed
protection from deportation.71 She remarked that “[a] woman accused of
prostitution must not be flung out of the country upon flimsy evidence, without
due process of law.”72 However, her calls remained unheard.
Throughout the twenty-first century, Congress also remained concerned
about labor trafficking practices “that mirror the injustices of slavery,” including

“An Act To regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States,” banning noncitizens from
engaging in commercial sex within three years of entry. Immigration Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-96,
§ 1134, 34 Stat. 898, 899–900 (criminalizing importing individuals for commercial sex).
65. See sources cited supra note 64.
66. Dr. Maude Miner Hadden, for example, pointed out that immigrant women were “more
easily exploited because of ignorance of American customs, language, and agencies to which they might
turn for help. . . . They are cowed by threats of deportation [made by procurers].” Kelli Ann McCoy,
Claiming Victims: The Mann Act, Gender, and Class in the American West, 1910–1930s, at 40 (2010)
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, San Diego) (citing MAUDE MINER HADDEN, QUEST FOR
PEACE: PERSONAL AND POLITICAL (1968)), https://escholarship.org/content/qt8f60q9gt/
qt8f60q9gt.pdf [ https://perma.cc/AQE5-FB7R ]. Jane Addams, another reformer, simply called for “a
less punitive policy that protected immigrants from exploitation.” Id. (citing JANE ADDAMS, NEW
CONSCIENCE AND AN ANCIENT EVIL 26, 35 (1912)).
67. VICE COMM’N OF CHICAGO, THE SOCIAL EVIL IN CHICAGO 40 (4th ed. 1912). See also
U.S. IMMIGR. COMM’N, ABSTRACTS OF REPORTS OF THE IMMIGRATION COMMISSION,
S. DOC. NO. 61-747, at 342 (3d Sess. 1910) (describing how the immigrant woman “is ignorant of the
language of the country, knows nothing beyond a few blocks of the city where she lives, has usually no
money, and no knowledge of the rescue homes and institutes which might help her”).
68. Wagner & McCann, supra note 55, at 724. For example, “[t]he Commissioner argued that
existing immigration laws were ‘not extensive and drastic enough in terms to effectively prevent further
additions to the already large numbers of alien prostitutes and procurers in this country’ and did not
sufficiently regulate ‘the free passage to and fro of those engaged in [trafficking].’” See also
SUPPRESSION OF THE WHITE-SLAVE TRAFFICK: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, S. DOC. NO. 61-214, pt. 2, at 14 (2d Sess. 1910).
69. White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2421–2424).
70. See id. Indeed, some immigrants deemed “helpful” in Mann Act cases at prosecution were
eventually deported. See McCoy, supra note 66, at 151.
71. See Egal Feldman, Prostitution, the Alien Woman and the Progressive Imagination,
1910–1915, at 19 AM. Q. 199, 200 (1967).
72. Id.
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those involving immigrant workers.73 The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited
slavery, involuntary servitude, and related practices, yet such practices persisted.74
Many scholars have argued that the Thirteenth Amendment embodied broad
guarantees of freedom beyond African slavery.75 Nevertheless, courts failed to
interpret the Thirteenth Amenmdnet expansively to include affirmative rights or
protections for immigrant workers, such as the freedom from deportation.76
In 1940, Congress passed enabling statutes pursuant to the Thirteenth
Amendment to criminalize peonage, enticement into slavery, and sale into
involuntary servitude.77 Although such statutes did not define a crime of “labor
trafficking,” these statutes would remain the primary criminal enforcement tools
aimed at labor trafficking throughout the twentieth century. Yet, even as
prosecutions began to move forward, immigrant victims, even those who
cooperated fully with federal prosecutors, often faced detention, deportation, and
an uncertain future in the United States.78

73. See, e.g., Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrants Rights and the Thirteenth Amendment, NEW
LAB. F., Spring 2007, at 26, 27 (“[W]hen declaring slavery and involuntary servitude unconstitutional,
the Amendment sought to affirmatively protect free labor by establishing a definition of free labor
more expansive than the absence of chattel slavery.”).
74. See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, The Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery, Capitalism, and
Mass Incarceration, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 908 (2019) (exploring how the Thirteenth Amendment
“forb[id] one form of slavery while legitimating and preserving others”).
75. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see also Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth
Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8 (1995) (“From the opening gavel, both sides in the
legislative debates based their arguments on a common understanding that the Thirteenth Amendment
would protect an expansive definition of freedom.”). Lea VanderVelde, through historiography, has
examined how the Amendment provided “charter for labor freedom,” which sought to affirmatively
protect the rights of labor “autonomy and independence.” Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the
Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 438 (1989) [ hereinafter VanderVelde, Labor Vision ]
(arguing that the Congressional debate embodied a “free labor” vision, and thus, the Amendment
sought to improve the “cause of all working people,” not only those subject to African slavery). Some
scholars have critiqued VanderVelde’s expansive vision, calling this historiography “deeply flawed” and
“significantly overstating” of the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Pamela Brandwein, The
“Labor Vision” of the Thirteenth Amendment, Revisited, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 13, 17 (2017)
(“Multiple arrays of evidence support the conclusion that VanderVelde mistakes free labor for a
discourse of class leveling and thus mistakes the Thirteenth Amendment as a charter for
labor freedom.”).
76. See, e.g., James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law
of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L. J. 1474, 1478 (2010) (“[I]t prohibits two conditions—slavery
and involuntary servitude—without specifying what rights are necessary to negate those conditions.”).
The Thirteenth Amendment, instead, relied on Congress to “enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
77. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1583–1584.
78. See, e.g., KEVIN BALES & STEVEN LIZE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 70 (2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/211980.pdf [ https://perma.cc/
6WX2-MMER ] (describing the use of detention and fear of removal to coerce immigrant victims
to cooperate).

Clean Final Edit_Dahlstrom_V3.docx (Do Not Delete)

11/8/21 8:12 AM

74

[Vol. 12:61

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW
B. Contemporary Efforts to Address Trafficking

In the 1990s, several high-profile cases showcased the brutality of human
trafficking and the imperfect tools available to shield immigrant victims from
deportation.79 In 1995, for example, government officials raided a complex where
they found seventy-two Thai nationals working in slave-like conditions in residential
duplexes in El Monte, California.80 Recruiters forced victims to work while holding
their passports and money.81 The case was followed by a highly publicized labor
trafficking case in 1997 in Jackson Heights, New York, involving fifty-seven deaf
immigrants.82 Renato Paoletti Lemus, the alleged boss of the operation, and his
family members recruited Mexican immigrants through “promises of a sweeter life”
in the United States.83 Yet, once the victims arrived, Lemus and his associates took
their documents, forced them to work, and subjected them to emotional, physical,
and sexual abuse.84
Sex trafficking, too, was in the headlines.85 In 1998, the New York Times
publicized a fifty-two-count indictment against sixteen people, six of whom were
from the same Cadena family, for “enslav[ing]” at least twenty women, some as
young as fourteen, for over a year.86 Immigrant women were recruited from Mexico
to work in “landscaping, health care, housecleaning and restaurants.”87 Upon arrival
in the United States, the Cadenas forced their victims to have sex with men in
agricultural migrant camps to repay their smuggling debt.88 Those who tried to
escape were beaten and sexually abused.89
These cases publicly highlighted the deficiencies of existing protection
measures for immigrant victims.90 In the El Monte trafficking cases, immigration
79. See ALICIA PETERS, RESPONDING TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING: SEX, GENDER, AND
CULTURE IN THE LAW 57–58 (2015).
80. Id. at 57.
81. Erin Blakemore, 20th-Century Slavery Was Hiding in Plain Sight, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (July
31, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/20th-centuryslavery-california-sweatshop-was-hiding-plain-sight-180975441/[ https://perma.cc/8E3M-Y5WB ].
82. PETERS, supra note 79, at 1–2; Deborah Sontag, Dozens of Deaf Immigrants Discovered in
Forced Labor, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/20/nyregion/dozensof-deaf-immigrants-discovered-in-forced-labor.html#:~:text=Four%20deaf%20and%20mute%20
Mexicans,bunk%20beds%2C%20mattresses%20and%20sleeping [ https://perma.cc/U9AX-6JWN ].
83. KEVIN BALES & RON SOODALTER, THE SLAVE NEXT DOOR: HUMAN TRAFFICKING
AND SLAVERY IN AMERICA TODAY 124 (2009).
84. See, e.g., Joseph P. Fried, 2 Sentenced in Mexican Peddling Ring, N.Y. TIMES (May 8,
1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/08/nyregion/2-sentenced-in-mexican-peddling-ring.html
[ https://perma.cc/RVY9-HKBG ]; BALES & SOODALTER, supra note 83, at 124.
85. Mireya Navarro, Group Forced Illegal Aliens into Prostitution, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 24, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/24/us/group-forced-illegal-aliens-intoprostitution-us-says.html [ https://perma.cc/NS2Z-9JWR ].
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. AMY O’NEILL RICHARD, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF INTEL., INTERNATIONAL
TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN TO THE UNITED STATES: A CONTEMPORARY MANIFESTATION OF
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officials detained and held victims in Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
custody.91 Although eventually released after public protests, immigrant victims
faced a long, uncertain battle against deportation.92 One victim, speaking at a
criminal trafficking sentencing hearing, noted: “We were slaves . . . and we have
nothing to show for it. I am very angry.”93
These practices were, unfortunately, widespread.94 A report entitled
International Trafficking in Women to the United States drew national attention to
continued protection challenges for immigrant victims.95 The report unearthed how
victims were often detained and placed in jails if they failed to voluntarily depart.96
It also shed light on troubling practices of INS officials who—apparently
uncomfortable with “play[ing] favorites”—often conflated victims with “other
undocumented workers” and subjected both groups to harsh
immigration consequences.97
Law enforcement continued to rely heavily on an imperfect array of existing
immigration benefits, including deferred action,98 parole,99 and S visas,100 to protect

SLAVERY AND ORGANIZED CRIME 41–44 (2000), https://www.cia.gov/static/9dc85
527075bc84f9e1f2eef0e7a0915/trafficking.pdf[ https://perma.cc/U49S-MTJ7 ]; see also PETERS, supra
note 79, at 2 (describing how in the Paoletti case, for example, “[p]ublic sympathy for the victim and
the fact that many New Yorkers had encountered these very individuals in their daily commutes
promoted the city to offer an enormous amount of public resources to the victims”).
91. Blakemore, supra note 81. In the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress discontinued
the INS and created three agencies under a newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
including USCIS, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. See
USCIS HIST. OFF. & LIBR., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY 11
(2012), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/fact-sheets/INSHistory.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/ZSD2-6WBS ].
92.
Erik Loomis, Historian Erik Loomis on the El Monte Sweatshop Raid, UNITE ALL
WORKERS FOR DEMOCRACY (Aug. 3, 2020), https://uawd.org/historian-erik-loomis-on-the-elmonte-sweatshop -raid/[ https://perma.cc/5JM2-2FRD ].
93. BALES & SOODALTER, supra note 83, at 124.
94. See RICHARD, supra note 90, at 35.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 39 (“Currently, they say that many trafficking victims are placed in INS detention
facilities and then deported. Those few trafficking victims, who are designated material witnesses in
federal criminal cases brought against the traffickers, may be placed in the US marshals’ custody and
held in local jails.”).
97. Id. at 36.
98. Deferred action provides access to a work permit and the deferral of removal, but it is not
an immigration status. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://
www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/frequently-asked-questions [ https://perma.cc/
LZX7-EZ6J ] (Aug. 31, 2021) (“Deferred action is a discretionary determination to defer a removal
action of an individual as an act of prosecutorial discretion.”).
99. Parole allowed victims to be admitted or enter for “urgent humanitarian reasons” and obtain
work authorization, but it does not open up a pathway to permanent residency or citizenship.
Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 163, 188 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).
100. The S visa, colloquially referred to as the “snitch” visa, was established by Congress in
1994 pursuant to the Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(S).
Congress provided two hundred S visas per year to two categories of noncitizens: (1) those who

Clean Final Edit_Dahlstrom_V3.docx (Do Not Delete)

11/8/21 8:12 AM

76

[Vol. 12:61

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

against deportation. These ill-fitting remedies were insufficient, leaving immigrant
victims at the mercy of unsympathetic governmental officials.101 As a result, victims
were left in limbo; some even faced deportation.102
Many scholars and advocates called for the creation of a new, specialized form
of immigration relief for trafficking victims, known as the T visa. This benefit, they
argued, would allow law enforcement to benefit from “material witnesses” while
granting victims a “resting period” during which they could receive assistance
without fear of deportation.103 Well-known immigration advocates, such as Arthur
Helton and Eliana Jacobs, proclaimed the great potential of the T visa.104 Rather
than envisioning the T visa as “humanitarian relief for those who have been
abused,” Helton and Jacobs noted that “[a] more powerful rationale would be to
view the grant of immigration status as an incentive to enlist the victims in
identifying and prosecuting traffickers.”105 The T visa, they argued, would be “a
powerful new tool . . . made available to law enforcers in their efforts to curb
clandestine trafficking networks.”106
C. Federal Legislation to Protect Immigrant Victims
In 2000, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), the
first comprehensive federal human trafficking law.107 Congress remained largely
focused on international human trafficking, involving immigrant victims.108
Congress recognized trafficking as a “transnational crime with national
implications.”109 Legislators observed that “[a]t least 700,000 persons annually,
primarily women and children, are trafficked within or across international
borders,” with “[a]pproximately 50,000 women and children…trafficked into the
United States each year.”110 The TVPA came just days after the United Nations
provided critical information about a criminal enterprise or organization and (2) those who possess
information about terrorist activity. See RICHARD, supra note 90, at 41; see also Douglas Kash, Rewarding
Confidential Informants: Cashing In on Terrorism and Narcotics Trafficking, 34 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L
L. 231, 235 (2002).
101. See RICHARD, supra note 90, at 39.
102. See id. at 39, 41 (describing some victims who were deported and noting that “[i]n essence,
many trafficking victims remain in a sort of legal limbo”).
103. See RICHARD, supra note 90, at 42.
104. See Arthur C. Helton & Eliana Jacobs, Combating Human Smuggling by Enlisting the
Victims, 23 DEF. ALIEN 120, 127 (2000).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464.
108. See § 102(a), 114 Stat. at 1466; ANTHONY M. DESTEFANO, THE WAR ON HUMAN
TRAFFICKING: U.S. POLICY ASSESSED 32–41 (2007) (examining how Congress was primarily
concerned with immigrants trafficked into the United States in 2000 when passing federal
anti-trafficking law). The legislation took note that “[a]t least 700,000 persons annually, primarily
women and children, are trafficked within or across international borders.” § 102(b)(1), 114
Stat. at 1466.
109.
110.

TPVA § 102(b)(24).
Id. at 102(b)(1).
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General Assembly approved the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Trafficking Protocol).111
In the TVPA, Congress utilized a three-pronged approach aimed at
protection, prevention, and prosecution of trafficking both abroad and
domestically.112 Congress articulated new federal trafficking crimes and increased
criminal penalties for a wide range of trafficking-related conduct.113 In addition,
legislators outlined new protections for immigrant victims, including T visas for
victims of trafficking, U visas for victims of violent crime, and “Continued
Presence”114 for victims of trafficking who were witnesses in potential criminal
trafficking investigations.115 The legislation was bipartisan.116 As a result, the
immigration remedies embodied a dual purpose: to protect immigrant victims and
encourage cooperation with law enforcement.117
T Visas. Congress established T visas for victims of a “severe form of
trafficking in persons.”118 The statute defines a “severe form of trafficking in

111. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,
Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319 [ hereinafter Trafficking Protocol ].
112. See, e.g., Kelly E. Hyland, Protecting Human Victims of Trafficking: An American
Framework, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 29, 62 (2001) (examining the TVPA’s three-tier approach
addressing prevention, protection, and prosecution); Susan Tiefenbrun, The Cultural, Political, and
Legal Climate Behind the Fight to Stop Trafficking in Women: William J. Clinton’s Legacy to Women’s
Rights, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 855, 876–77 (2006).
113. Whereas sex trafficking cases had been previously charged often under the Mann Act or
involuntary servitude statutes, the TVPA established the new federal sex trafficking crime to address
commercial sex induced through force, fraud, or coercion, unless involving a minor under eighteen
years of age. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591. In addition, responding to the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), Congress created the new crime of forced labor to address
“labor or services” involving tactics of psychological coercion. See id. § 1589(a).
114. Continued Presence is a form of deferred action that provides victims of a “severe form
of trafficking in persons” who assist in a potential trafficking investigation. See 22
U.S.C. § 7105(c)(3)(A). It provides access to employment authorization and decreased prioritization for
removal. CTR. FOR COUNTERING HUMAN TRAFFICKING, CONTINUED PRESENCE: TEMPORARY
IMMIGRATION DESIGNATION FOR VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, https://www.ice.gov/
doclib/human-trafficking/pdf/continued-presence.pdf [ https://perma.cc/EYK2-XZJX ].
115. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
§§ 107(c)–(e), 1513(c), 114 Stat. 1464, 1474, 1533.
116. Chacón, Misery, supra note 41, at 2989 (“The final version of the Act had broad bipartisan
support, passing by a vote of 371-1 in the House and 95-0 in the Senate.”).
117. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 108(b)(2), 114 Stat. at 1481 (codified
as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(2)) (“Whether the government of the country protects victims of
severe forms of trafficking in persons and encourages their assistance in the investigation and
prosecution of such trafficking, including provisions for legal alternatives to their removal to countries
in which they would face retribution or hardship, and ensures that victims are not inappropriately
incarcerated, fined, or otherwise penalized solely for unlawful acts as a direct result of being
trafficked . . . .”).
118. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101(a)(15), 66 Stat. 163, 167
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)).
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persons,” as distinct from federal trafficking crimes.119 A “severe form of
trafficking in persons” means:
• the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision,
obtaining, patronizing, or soliciting of a person for the
purpose of a commercial sex act, in which the commercial sex
act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the
person induced to perform such act has not attained fifteen
years of age;120 (or)
• the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or
obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of
force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to
involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.121
The definition, which includes sex and labor trafficking, is expansive and
encompasses diverse industries, including restaurant, agricultural, and domestic
work.122 It has evolved to include a range of conduct—from brazen acts of physical
violence to subtle forms of coercion, like deportation threats.123
To qualify for a T visa, immigrant victims of a “severe form of trafficking”
must also meet other requirements.124 The TVPA originally provided that an
applicant must: (1) be physically present in the United States or territories “on
account of” the trafficking; (2) comply with any reasonable request for assistance
in the investigation or prosecution of acts of trafficking (unless under fifteen years
of age); (3) suffer extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm upon
removal; and (4) be admissible.125 These requirements, thus, significantly narrowed
the scope of potential victims who qualify.
For example, many victims found the requirement to engage with law
enforcement to be a significant barrier. In order to comply with a reasonable request
from law enforcement, adult victims must report to law enforcement and request a

119. Id.
120. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 103(8)(A), (9), 114 Stat. at 1481
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7102(11)(A), (12)).
121. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 103(8)(B) (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 7102(11)(B)).
122. See, e.g., Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
§ 102(b)(4), 114 Stat. 1464, 1466 (“Traffickers lure women and girls into their networks through false
promises of decent working conditions at relatively good pay as nannies, maids, dancers, factory
workers, restaurant workers, sales clerks, or models.”).
123. See Kathleen Kim, The Coercion of Trafficked Workers, 96 IOWA L. REV. 409, 438 (2011)
(“The TVPA supports a broad vision of coercion. It recognizes that in addition to physical force,
psychological abuse and nonviolent coercion create an environment of fear and intimidation that may
prevent a worker from leaving an exploitive work situation.”).
124. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101(a)(15), 66 Stat. 163, 167
(1952) (codified as amended at § 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)).
125. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 107(e)(1)(C), (3), 114 Stat. at
1477–78.
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special victim certification on Form I-914, Supplement B (I-914B).126 However,
many victims, due to trauma, stigma, or fear of reprisals, failed to report to law
enforcement.127 Law enforcement often lacked the training necessary to identify
victims of trafficking and refused to issue I-914Bs.128 As a result, some victims still
faced an uphill battle to qualify for relief.
Despite these challenges, the benefits of the T visa remain immense. Five
thousand T visas are available annually to victims, and Congress authorized
additional visas for derivative family members.129 T visa applicants are eligible for
work authorization.130 They have an eventual pathway to citizenship and can
petition for certain family members.131 T visa recipients also receive the same public
benefits as refugees, including specialized case management and vocational
assistance.132 These federal benefits serve as an essential lifeline to many victims
who otherwise lack access to basic necessities.
U Visas. In the TVPA, Congress also established U visas for victims of certain
violent crimes, including human trafficking.133 To qualify, an applicant must show
that (1) they are a victim of a qualifying crime under state or federal law; (2) the
crime violates U.S. law or occurred in the United States; (3) they suffered a
substantial injury related to the crime; (4) they have information about the crime;
(5) they were helpful, are helpful, or are likely to be helpful to law enforcement in

126. § 107(e)(1)(C), 114 Stat. at 1477; 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(a) (2020). While the I-914B was not
required, it served as primary evidence of the victim’s cooperation for many years. See id. § 214.11(d)(3).
The 2016 T visa regulations eliminated the distinction between secondary and primary evidence and
provided that all evidence, including the victim’s personal statement, should carry the same weight.
Classification for Victims of Severe Forms of Trafficking in Persons; Eligibility for “T” Nonimmigrant
Status, 81 Fed. Reg. 92299 (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-12-19/
pdf/2016-29900.pdf [ https://perma.cc/GV7X-HWVB ]. In later legislation, Congress clarified that
applicants who were victims when they were under 18 and those who met a limited trauma exception
need not respond to a reasonable request for assistance with law enforcement to qualify.
127. See, e.g., Carole Angel, Immigration Relief for Human Trafficking Victims: Focusing the Lens
on the Human Rights of Victims, 7 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 23, 25 n.9 (2007)
(noting how the law enforcement requirement is “a giant task when one knows that law enforcement
can deport”).
128. See, e.g., Haynes, supra note 38, at 366 (describing how lack of training for those in the field
contributes to reduced identification of victims).
129. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 107(e)(2), 114 Stat. at 1478.
130. 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(c)(1), (d)(11) (2020); 8 C.F.R. § 245.23(a) (2011).
131. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 107(e)(1)(C), 114 Stat. at 1477–78.
Victims are eligible to petition to reunify in the United States with certain family members, including
spouses and children under 21 for adult victims and even certain siblings and parents for child
applicants. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101(a)(15), 66 Stat. 163, 167
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(ii)).
132. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 107(b)(1)(B), 114 Stat. at 1475
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1)(B)) (“Federal agencies shall expand benefits and services
to victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons in the United States, and aliens classified as a
nonimmigrant under section 1101(a)(15)(T)(ii) of title 8, without regard to the immigration status of
such victims.”).
133. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15), 66 Stat. at 167 (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii)).

Clean Final Edit_Dahlstrom_V3.docx (Do Not Delete)

11/8/21 8:12 AM

80

[Vol. 12:61

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

the investigation or prosecution of the crime;134 and (6) they are admissible in the
United States.135 Qualifying crimes include a range of violent crimes, such
as trafficking, sexual exploitation, involuntary servitude, slave trade,
and prostitution.136
Like the T visa, the U visa provides recipients with a range of benefits. U visa
recipients qualify for work authorization and can petition for certain family
members.137 They have an eventual pathway to citizenship.138 Unlike the T visa,
however, the U visa processing times are lengthy. Ten thousand U visas are available
annually, but the cap is regularly reached.139 As a result, processing times often
exceed five years, in comparison to roughly two years in the T visa context.140 U
visa recipients also are not eligible for expansive federal public benefits141 and often
have to wait longer to apply for permanent residency.142
Continued Presence. Congress also established a new, temporary pathway for
work authorization called Continued Presence when law enforcement identified an

134. As in the T visa context, Congress required applicants to report the crime and assist in the
investigation and/or prosecution of the crime. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(III). However, unlike the T
visa context, the applicant must receive U nonimmigrant status certification, without which they simply
cannot qualify. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(2)(i) (2021).
135. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(2)(i) (2021).
136. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15), 66 Stat. at 167 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii)(II)(iii)) (defining qualifying crimes as rape, torture, trafficking, incest,
domestic violence, sexual assault, abusive sexual contact, prostitution, sexual exploitation, stalking,
female genital mutilation, being held hostage, peonage, involuntary servitude, slave trade, kidnapping,
abduction, unlawful criminal restraint, false imprisonment, blackmail, extortion, manslaughter, murder,
felonious assault, witness tampering, obstruction of justice, perjury, and fraud in foreign
labor contracting).
137. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(7), (f) (2021).
138.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 245(m), 66 Stat. at 217 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1255(m)); 8 C.F.R. § 245.24 (2021).
139. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d) (2021); Natalie Nanasi, The U Visa’s Failed Promise for Survivors of
Domestic Violence, 29 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 273, 277 (2018).
140. See HUM. RTS. INITIATIVE N. TEX. & SMU JUDGE ELMO B. HUNTER LEGAL
CTR., FLAWED DESIGN: HOW THE U VISA IS REVICTIMIZING THE PEOPLE IT WAS CREATED TO
HELP (2020), https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/629a772b95e14b3aa05941ae309909f0 [ https://
perma.cc/T3YP-4ZJ7 ] (“Because of the cap, people filing a U visa petition today can expect to wait 7
to 10 years for approval.”); Check Case Processing Times, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://
egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/ [ https://perma.cc/MU86-M5UZ ] ( last visited Oct. 9, 2021 ).
141. See ALINA HUSAIN & LESLYE E. ORLOFF, NAT’L IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S
ADVOC. PROJECT & AM. UNIV. WASHINGTON COLL. OF L., PUBLIC BENEFITS FOR U VISA
APPLICANTS 1 (June 19, 2015), https://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/wp-content/uploads/
PublicBenefits forUVisaApplicantsfactsheet.pdf [ https://perma.cc/7TCN-RQXE ] (“Among the
forms of immigration relief designed to offer protection for immigrant crime victims, the U visa comes
with the least access to federal and state funded public benefits.”).
142. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 245.24 (2021), with 8 C.F.R. § 245.23 (2021) (allowing T visa recipients
to adjust earlier than U visa repients if they have “been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period during the investigation or prosecution of acts of trafficking and the Attorney
General has determined that the investigation or prosecution is complete”).
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immigrant victim as a potential witness in a criminal trafficking investigation.143
Unlike the T visa, victims cannot apply on their own for Continued Presence.144
Rather, federal law enforcement has to effectively sponsor the application.145 Once
eligible, victims can receive deferred action,146 a work permit, and access to federal
public benefits.147 In this way, Continued Presence provides an important stopgap
measure to allow immigrant victims to work and remain while preparing their T visa
applications and when their T visa applications are pending.148
D. A Flawed Federal Framework
The TVPA represented a significant step forward for immigrant victims. Still,
in the first ten years of the program, significant barriers remained.149 In the initial
years, fewer than 300 T visas were issued.150 Continued Presence approvals
remained dismally low.151 Meanwhile, U visa application and approval rates
skyrocketed.152 In fiscal year 2009, for example, USCIS received 6,835 U visa
applications and approved 5,825 pending cases the same year.153 In comparison,
USCIS received only 461 T visa applications and approved 290
then-pending applications.154
Congress responded by easing obstacles within the T visa program for
immigrant victims.155 In legislative reauthorizations in 2003 and 2008, Congress

143. See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(3)(A) (establishing that Continued Presence is available to any
individual who is “a victim of a severe form of trafficking and a potential witness to such trafficking”).
144. See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(3)(A)(i).
145. See id.
146. USCIS defines deferred action as “a discretionary determination to defer a removal action
of an individual as an act of prosecutorial discretion.” Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-of-deferred-action-forchildhood-arrivals-daca/frequently-asked-questions [ https://perma.cc/UZ7B-FTBY ] ( last visited
Oct. 9, 2021 ).
147. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, CONTINUED PRESENCE: TEMPORARY DESIGNATION
FOR VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
blue-campaign/19_1028_bc-pamphlet-continued-presence.pdf [ https://perma.cc/Z5DW-Y698 ].
148. Bo Cooper, A New Approach to Protection and Law Enforcement Under the Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, 51 EMORY L.J. 1041, 1052 (2002).
149. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T), (U)(iii).
150. See CHRISTAL MOREHOUSE, COMBATING HUMAN TRAFFICKING POLICY GAPS AND
HIDDEN POLITICAL AGENDAS IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 117 (2009) (stating that in
2002, the first year where data was available, 172 victims were granted T visas, 453 applications were
submitted, and thirteen were denied).
151. MOREHOUSE, supra note 150, at 117.
152. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., NUMBER OF FORM I-918, PETITION FOR U
NONIMMIGRANT STATUS, BY FISCAL YEAR, QUARTER, AND CASE STATUS 2009–2017, https://
www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/data/I918u_visastatistics_fy2017_qtr4.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/MA6Z-SX39 ].
153. Id.
154. See USCIS STATISTICS, supra note 21.
155. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114
Stat. 1464 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 8, 22); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, § 4(a)(3)(A), 117 Stat. 2875, 2878 [ hereinafter TVPRA of 2003 ];
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expanded exceptions to the requirement to respond to a reasonable request from
law enforcement.156 Congress increased the age for children from fifteen to eighteen
years of age who need not report to law enforcement to remain eligible for the T
visa.157 Moreover, Congress added a new trauma exception, allowing any victim who
“is unable to cooperate with [such] a request [from law enforcement] due to physical
or psychological trauma” to qualify.158 Congress additionally extended Continued
Presence to two years and allowed noncitizens to qualify based on a pending federal
civil lawsuit against their perpetrator.159 USCIS also issued regulations to further
ease other T visa requirements and encourage more victims to apply.160
Despite these efforts, T visa approvals161 only increased slightly, and more
recently, denial rates have skyrocketed.162 By fiscal year 2016, USCIS received 955
applications for T visas and approved 748 pending applications.163 That year, the
agency denied 18.96% of pending T visa applications.164 The denial rate increased
significantly to 42.2% in fiscal year 2019 and 42.79% in 2020.165 The chart166 below
illustrates these rising rates of denial:

William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457,
122 Stat. 5044 (2008) [ hereinafter TVPRA of 2008 ].
156. See source cited supra note 155.
157. Id.
158. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(iii); 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(b)(3)(ii) (2012) (establishing that a
noncitizen “who, due to physical or psychological trauma, is unable to cooperate with a reasonable
request for assistance in the Federal, State, or local investigation or prosecution of acts of trafficking in
persons, or the investigation of a crime where acts of trafficking in persons are at least one central
reason for the commission of that crime, is not required to comply with such reasonable request”).
159. 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(3) (2000) (stating that Continued Presence is available to “a potential
witness to such trafficking” and that “the Secretary of Homeland Security may permit the alien to
remain in the United States to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for such
crime”); 28 C.F.R. § 1100.35 (2016).
160. See Classification for Victims of Severe Forms of Trafficking in Persons; Eligibility for
“T” Nonimmigrant Status, 81 Fed. Reg. 92266 (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/FR-2016-12-19/pdf/2016-29900.pdf [ https://perma.cc/GV7X-HWVB ].
161. T-1 visas are awarded to victims of a “severe form of trafficking,” as opposed to T-2,
T-3, T-4, T-5, and T-6 visas for derivative family members. See id. at 92266–70. This Article primarily
focuses on approval rates for T-1 visas for victims of trafficking. Thus, throughout, the Article uses
the term “T visa” as a shorthand for T-1 visa.
162. See USCIS STATISTICS, supra note 21.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. Id.
166. This figure is based on data available from USCIS. See id. The percentage represents the
number of T visa cases for victims of trafficking (i.e., T-1 visas) adjudicated each fiscal year. The rate
is calculated by dividing the number of cases for victims of trafficking denied during a fiscal year by
the sum of the number of cases approved and denied each fiscal year.
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Figure 1: Percentage of T Visa Applications Denied by Fiscal Year (2008
to 2020)
Surprisingly, rising denial rates have coincided with increased identification of
and greater access to pro bono legal representation for victims. In the past four
years, federally-funded providers have provided services to more immigrant victims
of trafficking.167 The number of immigrant victims and derivative family members
identified by certain government-funded programs steadily increased from 915 in
2013 to 1,612 in 2018 and 1,573 in 2019.168 At the same time, the number of new
immigrant victims of trafficking served by programs funded by the
U.S. Department of Justice rose from 1,009 in 2013 to 5,090 in 2019.169
Simultaneously, the number of immigrant children of trafficking identified by the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services grew, rising from 50 in 2009 to
892 in 2019.170
The federal government simultaneously poured new, unprecedented funding
into pro bono legal representation for victims of trafficking—efforts that should
improve legal outcomes for trafficking victims.171 In fiscal year 2017, the
U.S. Department of Justice provided over $8.8 million to establish the Crime Victim

167. This data was compiled by the author based on data available from annual Trafficking in
Persons Reports issued by the U.S. Department of State (on file with author).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services issues Interim Assistance and
Eligibility Letters to minor victims of a severe form of trafficking. See Eligibility Letters, OFF. ON
TRAFFICKING
IN
PERS.,
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/otip/victim-assistance/eligibility-letters
[ https://perma.cc/2QGX-Y9MH ] (Oct. 24, 2021).
171. See Awards Listing, OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, https://ovc.ojp.gov/funding/awards/
list [ https://perma.cc/5R9M-QRJM ] ( last visited Oct. 9, 2021 ). This included the initiation of new
grants to provide specialized services and resulted in $9.11 million over the following four years. Id.
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Justice Corps,172 funding sixty-two new attorney fellows to represent victims.173 The
federal government also awarded significant funding to the Coalition Against
Slavery and Trafficking (CAST), a national anti-trafficking NGO, to formalize
training and a technical assistance program to improve outcomes in T visa cases.174
As a result, in 2018, CAST trained 337 attorneys in thirty states, and responded to
900 individual requests for technical assistance, a fifteen percent increase
from 2017.175
As funding for legal services expanded, applications for T visas increased
modestly.176 Whereas USCIS only received 541 T visa applications in fiscal year
2010, this number rose to 1,242 and 1,110 in 2019 and 2020, respectively.177 The
chart178 below illustrates the rising T visa applications received, alongside the
number of T visas approved and denied by USCIS since 2008:

Figure 2: Number of T-1 Visa Applications Received, Approved, and
Denied by USCIS by Fiscal Year (2008 to 2020)
Thus, despite greater identification of victims, access to legal services, and
slowly rising application rates, approval rates are on the decline.
172. OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST, CRIME VICTIMS JUSTICE
CORPS - LEGAL FELLOWS PROGRAM PURPOSE AREA 1 – INCREASING CAPACITY AND ACCESS TO
CIVIL LEGAL HELP FOR CRIME VICTIMS THROUGH LEGAL FELLOWS PROGRAM, https://
external.ojp.usdoj.gov/SelectorServer/awards/pdf/award/2017-MU-MU-K131/2017-40441-DC-VF/
2017 [ https://perma.cc/E3SD-Z32M ].
173. See Allie Yang-Green, Supporting Human Trafficking Survivors Through Civil Legal Aid,
EQUAL JUST. WORKS ( Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.equaljusticeworks.org/news/supporting-humantrafficking-survivors-through-civil-legal-aid/ [ https://perma.cc/T9JK-NUML ].
174. Id.
175. COAL. TO ABOLISH SLAVERY & TRAFFICKING, IMPACT REPORT 2018, at 21 (2018),
http://www.castla.org/wp-content/themes/castla/assets/files/Cast-Impact-Report-2018.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/RLX8-8LF2 ] ( last visited Oct. 2, 2021 ).
176. See USCIS STATISTICS, supra note 21.
177. Id.
178. This figure was created by the author based on data available from USCIS. See id.
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E. Rationales for Insufficient Protection
Scholars have identified diverse rationales for low T visa application and
approval rates.179 Dina Haynes has described how Congress, by requiring adult
victims to cooperate with law enforcement, undermined the efficacy of the T visa.180
Law enforcement agents remain, in many ways, the gatekeepers for immigration
protection, and the prominent role of policing in the T visa program has prevented
many victims from accessing protection.181 Law enforcement often has been
insufficiently trained and unattuned to more subtle forms of trafficking.182 Further,
most immigrant victims also have not been found “chained to a bed in a
brothel” and are often left unidentified by law enforcement and unable to
access protection.183
Building on Haynes’ insights, Jayashri Srikantiah has also examined how
Congress, in establishing the T visa, envisioned a simplistic, passive “iconic”

179. See, e.g., Haynes, supra note 38 (asserting that the emphasis on prosecution and criminal
investigations combined with the lack of training by law enforcement limited the ability of actors to
protect immigrant victims); Srikantiah, supra note 9 (arguing that administrative officials and law
enforcement impermissibly limited the availability of the T visa by focusing on the “iconic” victim,
placing too much emphasis on law enforcement cooperation); Ivy C. Lee. & Mie Lewis, Human
Trafficking from a Legal Advocate’s Perspective: History, Legal Framework and Current Anti-Trafficking
Efforts, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 169, 171 (2003) (describing how the twofold congressional
focus on prosecution and protection “impacts the kinds of relief that trafficked persons may receive”);
Ivy Lee, An Appeal of a T Visa Denial, 14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 455 (2007) (analyzing a T
visa denial); Cianciarulo, supra note 38 (describing how law enforcement’s unrealistic expectations of
immigrant victims ability and desire to cooperate imperil victim protections); Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo,
Modern-Day Slavery and Cultural Bias: Proposals for Reforming the U.S. Visa System for Victims of
International Human Trafficking, 7 NEV. L.J. 826, 835–40 (2007) (providing recommendations to
overcome persistent challenges in the T visa framework); Sally Terry Green, Protection for Victims of
Child Sex Trafficking in the United States: Forging the Gap Between U.S. Immigration Laws and Human
Trafficking Laws, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 309 (2008) (documenting how child victims of sex
trafficking face immense challenges obtaining T visas, despite relaxed requirements for victims under
18). Not all scholars were overtly critical of the TVPA’s approach to anti-trafficking protections. See,
e.g., Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Updating the Domestic and International Impact of the U.S. Victims of
Trafficking Protection Act of 2000: Does Law Deter Crime?, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 249, 278–79
(2006–2007) (noting the “positive impact of the TVPA on the enactment of anti-trafficking legislation
in foreign countries” and comparing domestic practices with other countries, like Belgium, Italy, and
the Netherlands, which had fewer available protections for immigrant victims).
180. Haynes, supra note 38, at 346 (“There are consequences to having such an emphasis on
prosecution that not only works to the detriment of victims but also undermines the intent of
the TVPA.”).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 349 (describing how viewing trafficking through the lens of law enforcement can
“exacerbate the tendency of U.S. government personnel to treat trafficked persons as criminals,
particularly when the victim does not fit into the expected mold of being rescued after being found
chained to a bed in a brothel”). Haynes also described challenges that law enforcement faced in
identifying victims when they often “subscribe[d] overtly or covertly to unhelpful myths about the
nature of victims and criminals.” Id.

Clean Final Edit_Dahlstrom_V3.docx (Do Not Delete)

11/8/21 8:12 AM

86

[Vol. 12:61

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

victim.184 Congress “contemplate[d] a victim of sex trafficking who passively waits
for rescue by law enforcement, and upon rescue, presents herself as a good witness
who cooperates with all law enforcement requests.”185 This embrace of simplistic
victim narratives, embedded in the statutory and regulatory framework, has led to
insufficient identification by law enforcement and adjudicators.186
Moreover, racialized and gendered narratives about trafficking have driven
anti-trafficking enforcement and protection agendas.187 Cheryl Nelson Butler has
explored how African slavery and its legacy rendered Black women more vulnerable
to sex trafficking, yet anti-trafficking efforts have often ignored non-white
victims.188 Instead, white, cisgender victims have more readily received public
support, services, and legal protection.189 Meanwhile, the myth of the “iconic”
white, cisgender victim continues to dominate enforcement efforts and imperil
efforts to identify BIPOC and LGBTQ+ victims.190
Scholars, too, have drawn attention to the incompatibility of immigration
enforcement and anti-trafficking agendas.191 Many trafficking victims are

184. Srikantiah, supra note 9, at 177 (describing how the regulations and agency implementation
of the TVPA envision a prototypical victim with several characteristics: (1) the victim is a woman or
girl trafficked for sex; (2) law enforcement assesses her to be a good witness; (3) she cooperates fully
with law enforcement investigations; and (4) she is rescued instead of escaping from the
trafficking enterprise).
185. Id.
186. Id. Other scholars, including Sally Green and Bridgette Carr, have further explored these
deficiencies, highlighting how the T visa often failed to work even for the most vulnerable. See Green,
supra note 179; Bridgette Carr, Examining the Reality of Foreign National Child Victims of Human
Trafficking in the United States, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 183 (2011) (examining how child victims
face challenging when applying for T visas). They have pointed to evidence that trafficked children
frequently cannot effectively access T visas. Green, supra note 179, at 313.
187. See, e.g., Cheryl Nelson Butler, The Racial Roots of Human Trafficking, 62 UCLA
L. REV. 1464 (2015) (examining how race and racism shaped the problem of human trafficking as well
as enforcement agendas that focus on the “iconic white female victim”); Karen E. Bravo, Exploring the
Analogy Between Modern Trafficking in Humans and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 25 B.U. INT’L
L.J. 207, 247 (2007) (examining how early trafficking efforts were aimed at white women, ignoring
Black victims).
188. Nelson Butler, supra note 187, at 1495–1502.
189. Srikantiah centers this critique in critical theory, explaining how dominant narratives about
victimization often have excluded BIPOC and LGBTQ+ victims. Srikantiah, supra note 9, at 202 n.235
(citing Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The
African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003, 1070–71;
Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1243–44 (1991); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists
and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2438 (1989); Martha Fineman, Dominant
Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101
HARV. L. REV. 727, 730 (1988); Leslie Reagan, Victim or Accomplice?: Crime, Medical Malpractice, and
the Construction of the Aborting Woman in American Case Law, 1860s-1970, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 311, 314–15 (2001); Lucie White, Representing “The Real Deal,” 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 271,
295–96 (1990–1991)).
190. Nelson Butler, supra note 187, at 1495–1502.
191. Chacón, Tensions, supra note 38 (exposing the trade-offs between immigration enforcement
and anti-trafficking efforts).
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undocumented and, thus, subject to immigration enforcement efforts.192 As
Jennifer Chacón has observed, the “line between voluntary migrants who participate
in smuggling schemes and unwilling trafficking victims” is “murky at best” and “has
been vigilantly policed.”193 The very efforts to root out trafficking often have
negative collateral consequences—reinforcing concepts of migrant criminality and
deepening the underlying vulnerability of immigrant communities to trafficking and
exploitation.194 This critique has been borne out under the Trump administration,
as heightened immigration enforcement efforts have rendered immigrant
communities more vulnerable to trafficking.195 Meanwhile, victims, more fearful of
deportation, remained less likely to report abuse or seek protection.196
II. THE SHALLOW STATE
A. Trafficking and the Shallow State
These scholarly critiques, while important, fail to adequately explain the recent
decline in T visa approvals for victims. This Part asserts that rising T visa denial
rates have been largely driven by administrative actors, who have erected new
roadblocks within the T visa application process. Law and society scholars have
shown how administrative, enforcement, and adjudicatory actors play a significant
role in shaping legal protections.197 Despite “law in books,” the actions of
administrative, adjudicatory, and enforcement actors can deeply impact “law in
action.”198 While not unique to trafficking cases, this phenomenon is especially
apparent here because administrative and law enforcement officials play a formative
role in shaping outcomes as applicants apply for T visas.199 This Part focuses on
how low-level administrative actors operated in recent years to erect new barriers

192. See, e.g., POLARIS, THE LATINO FACE OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND EXPLOITATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 8 (2020), https://polarisproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/
EXECUTIVE-SUMMARY-The-Latino-Face-of-Human-Trafficking-and-Exploitation-in-the-UnitedStates.pdf [ https://perma.cc/FP8A-F3X7 ] (documenting how a majority of trafficking survivors in
domestic work and the agriculture sector are undocumented).
193. Chacón, Tensions, supra note 38, at 1615.
194. Id. (describing how immigration enforcement efforts, often under the guise of combating
trafficking, have had “the perhaps unintended effect of reinforcing migrants’ vulnerability to
exploitation and made them more vulnerable to exploitation”).
195. See Dahlstrom, supra note 12.
196. See 2020 TIP REPORT, supra note 25, at 519 (describing a trend wherein “increasing number
of foreign national survivors . . . [were] afraid to report their cases to law enforcement, pursue
immigration options, or seek services”).
197. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of Organizations,
23 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 479 (1997).
198. See Leisy J. Abrego & Sarah M. Lakhani, Incomplete Inclusion: Legal Violence and Immigrants
in Liminal Legal Statuses, 37 LAW & POL’Y 265, 266 (2015) (citing Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and
Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910)).
199. This Article focuses primarily on administrative, rather than enforcement, actors and their
role in limiting immigration protections. However, law enforcement also plays a considerable role in
shaping outcomes in the T visa context.
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for immigrant victims within the T visa application process and, through their
policies and actions, significantly eroded avenues for protection.
B. The Shallow State Defined
In 2017, David Rothkopf, a professor of international relations, defined the
term, “shallow state,”200 to refer to “the antithesis of the deep state.”201 The term
“deep state” has been the subject of much scholarly debate for years.202 Yet, it
gained traction in the Trump administration as scholars and journalists sought to
explain the actions of career bureaucrats, reportedly working to undermine the
objectives of the executive.203 Scholars originally applied the term “deep state” to
executive officials, but it has now evolved to apply to a wider range of actors,
including intelligence, national security, and bureaucratic personnel, who may
leverage their power and expertise to advance their goals, often to subvert the goals

200. See Rothkopf, supra note 44. Other journalists and scholars have added texture to the
portrait of the “shallow state.” See, e.g., Rex Nutting, Opinion, The Shallow State Is Thriving Under
Trump, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 24, 2018, 4:17 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/theshallow-state-is-thriving-under-trump-2018-04-24 [ https://perma.cc/XC5T-SD3U ] (defining the
term as: “a withering of the government’s capabilities”); Danielle Schulkin & Julia Brooks, Loyalty
Above All: The “Shallow State” of the Trump Administration, JUST SEC. (Nov. 2, 2020), https://
www.justsecurity.org/73226/loyalty-above-all-the-shallow-state-of-the-trump-administration/ [ https://
perma.cc/TK5F-G4HE ] (describing the “shallow state” as characterized by “hollowing” out of
expertise with many senior positions left open and others filled “whose most significant attribute
appears to be political loyalty to [President Trump] rather than deep experience and
professional excellence”).
201. Rothkopf, supra note 44.
202. Some scholars have written explicitly about the “deep state,” while others have catalogued
more generally the challenges and/or benefits of unelected bureaucrats who act in conflict with the
executive. See Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State, 104 IOWA
L. REV. 139, 143 (2018); CASS SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND LEVIATHAN: REDEEMING
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 2–7 (2020); MARC AMBINDER & D.B. GRAY, DEEP STATE: INSIDE THE
GOVERNMENT SECRECY INDUSTRY 4 (2013); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, JOHN A. DEARBORN
& DESMOND KING, PHANTOMS OF A BELEAGUERED REPUBLIC: THE DEEP STATE AND THE
UNITARY EXECUTIVE 13–23 (2021); MIKE LOFGREN, THE DEEP STATE: THE FALL OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE RISE OF A SHADOW GOVERNMENT 34–36 (2016); Jack Goldsmith,
Paradoxes of the Deep State, in CAN IT HAPPEN HERE?: AUTHORITANISM IN AMERICA (Cass
R. Sunstein ed., 2018); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, NATIONAL SECURITY AND DOUBLE GOVERNMENT
11–28 (2015).
203. Supra note 202; see, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, The American Deep State, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1653, 1654 (2018) (“Whether cast as insidious or cast aside as fictitious, the American ‘deep
state’ is an increasingly compelling concept in the Age of Trump.”); Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability in
the Deep State, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1532 (2018) (“Since taking office, President Trump and his supporters
have repeatedly railed against the ‘deep state.’”); JAMES B. STEWART, DEEP STATE: TRUMP, THE FBI,
AND THE RULE OF LAW (2019) (chronicling efforts by the FBI and the U.S. Department of Justice to
investigate President Trump); Frank Bruni, Opinion, The Deep State Is on a Roll, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/02/opinion/trump-fauci-deep-state.html [ https://
perma.cc/VLL7-XM4N ] (describing Anthony Fauci as part of the “deep state,” which is engaged in a
“righteous defense against the corruption of democracy”).
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of the executive.204 Legal scholarship has painted a quite polarized picture of deep
state actors.205 As Rebecca Ingber has observed, legal scholars have vacillated
between two camps.206 Some have opined about the dangers of a deep state,
“conjur[ing] images of shadowy, powerful bureaucrats, evoking and stoking fears of
the power that has accrued in the executive branch’s national security
bureaucracy.”207 Others have viewed the deep state as a source of “benevolent
internal constraints,” providing a key check on the Executive and a safeguard for
the “legitimacy of the administrative state.”208
Rothkopf, however, warned of the rise of a different phenomenon—the
shallow state. The shallow state, as he conceived it, refers to administrative officials
who “actively eschew[ed] experience, knowledge, relationships, insight, craft, special
skills, tradition, and shared values.”209 These actors, unlike the deep state, use the
administrative state and their knowledge of decision-making and formal rulemaking
instrumentally to serve the hidden agenda of the executive. They work in service of
an often obscure executive agenda, one which if promulgated through more formal
mechanisms such as rulemaking or legislation would likely cause a public backlash
or legal challenges. Instead, through careful, out of sight, and often unlawful action,
they mobilize their knowledge and skills quietly to obstruct, slow, or undermine the
statutory regime.210
C. Immigration Law and the Shallow State
This Article is particularly focused on the actions of low-level bureaucrats in
the immigration context.211 It deploys the term “bureaucrat” to refer to frontline
204. See Ingber, supra note 202, at 143. These figures, Rothkopf argued, can effectively leverage
power built over years “to advance their goals regardless of the whims or wants of elected public
officials.” Rothkopf, supra note 44.
205. See Ingber, supra note 202, at 143.
206. Id. at 144.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 142–44.
209. Rothkopf, supra note 44.
210. See Sarah Isgur, Opinion, We in the ‘Shallow State’ Thought We Could Help. Instead, We
Obscured the Reality of a Trump Presidency., WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2020, 8:27 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/sarah-isgur-shallow-state-trump-doj/2020/12/23/e843da1a-45
61-11eb-a277-49a6d1f9dff1 _story.html [ https://perma.cc/Z3F4-C7R9 ].
211. In the immigration context, while bureaucratic actors can be found in many agencies at the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, this Article focuses on bureaucratic actors at USCIS. USCIS
officers adjudicate immigration applications and implement agency guidance. In these roles, they have
power to decide the fates of immigrant applicants and informally shape policy that leads to
large-scale administrative change. While not the focus of this Article, scholars and journalists have also
defined the shallow state as hollowing out of the agency and the lack of competency in administrative
agencies. See Schulkin & Brooks, supra note 200. Critics remarked how President Trump appointed less
competent, less experienced officials, such as Stephen Miller, Kirstjen Nielsen, and Ken Cuccinelli, to
prominent roles within the immigration system. See id. Some of these political appointments, such as
that of Ken Cuccinelli and Chad Wolf, the former director of USCIS, have been patently unlawful and
later found to violate the Federal Vacancies Reform Act. See id.; see also James Doubek, Judge Says Ken
Cuccinelli Was Appointed Unlawfully To Top Immigration Post, NPR (Mar. 1, 2020, 11:23 PM), https:/
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workers in an administrative agency.212 Sociologists have defined “bureaucrat” in
an expansive sense, including a broad range of professional workers from
technocrats and policymakers to frontline or “street-level” decisionmakers.213
Sociologists have recognized that such bureaucrats, united by a common culture
and expertise, have considerable knowledge, power, and expertise.214 They
can exercise broad discretion and have considerable power within the
administrative agency.215
Often, bureaucrats are pictured as parochial office workers—resistant to
change—and responsible for repressive policies.216 Yet, recent literature has painted
a more optimistic view of bureaucrats.217 Scholars have pointed out how
bureaucrats can engage in “bottom-up” innovation that has the potential to
/www.npr.org/2020/03/01/811023475/judge-says-ken-cuccinelli-was-appointed-unlawfully-to-topimmigration-post [ https://perma.cc/W8KC-LR3B ]; Dennis Romero, Federal Judge Rules Acting DHS
Head Chad Wolf Unlawfully Appointed, Invalidates DACA Suspension, NBC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2020,
2:21 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/federal-judge-rules-acting-dhs-headchad-wolf-unlawfully-appointed-n1247848 [ https://perma.cc/Y5Y5-3WRV ]. Meanwhile, critics have
observed an overall brain drain, as experienced officials have left USCIS and the immigration court
system, hollowing out the agency and leaving it with reduced capacity to adjudicate immigration
applications. See, e.g., More Immigration Judges Leaving the Bench, TRAC IMMIGR. ( July 13, 2020),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/617/ [ https://perma.cc/EKX9-CBK7 ]
(“Turnover [in
immigration judges] is the highest since records began in FY 1997 over two decades ago.”); Louise
Radnofsky, High Turnover Roils Trump’s Immigration-Policy Ranks, WALL ST. J. ( June 12, 2019, 12:17
pm),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/high-turnover-roils-trumps-immigration-policy-ranks1156035
5978 [ https://perma.cc/SK7F-KDP5 ] (“In the past two months, almost every top job on immigration
policy has turned over once—and in some cases, twice—with the administration at times employing
creative maneuvers to get officials in place.”).
212. MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN
PUBLIC SERVICES, at xi (photo. reprt. 2010) (1980).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Max Weber, The Bureaucratization of Politics and the Economy, in ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC
SOCIOLOGY (Richard Swedberg ed., 1999) (“In a modern state the actual ruler is necessarily and
unavoidably the bureaucracy, since power is exercised neither through parliamentary speeches nor
monarchial enunciations but through the routines of administration.”); Larry B. Hill, Who Governs
the American Administrative State? A Bureaucratic-Centered Image of Governance, 1
J. PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY 261, 266 (1991) (“[B]ureaucracy is a significant actor in the
governance process, and the bureaucratic actor is able to rely upon a set of strategic advantages and
power bases . . . and exercises an important degree of discretion.”); LIPSKY, supra note 212, at 13 (“The
policy-making roles of streetlevel bureaucrats are built upon two interrelated facets of their
positions: relatively high degrees of discretion and relative autonomy from organizational authority.”).
216. See, e.g., Marie-Amélie George, Bureaucratic Agency: Administering the Transformation of
LGBT Rights, 36 YALE L. & POL. REV. 83, 83 (2017) (“In the 1940s and 1950s, the administrative state
served as a powerful engine of discrimination against homosexuals, with agency officials routinely
implementing anti-gay policies that reinforced gays’ and lesbians’ subordinate social and legal status.”).
217. See, e.g., id. (describing how bottom-up innovation can improve LGBTQ+ rights claims);
Tatiana Camelia Dogaru, Street-Level Bureaucrats as Innovative Strategists: An Analytic Approach, 12
J. PUB. ADMIN. FIN. & L. 51 (2017) (demonstrating how street-level bureaucracy can be beneficial as
such actors can effectively adapt policy as they implement it). But cf. Richard Weatherley & Michael
Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucrats and Institutional Innovation: Implementing Special-Education Reform, 47
HARV. EDUC. REV. 171 (1977) [hereinafter Street-Level Bureaucrats] (examining how street-level actors
resisted special education reform in Massachusetts).
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positively impact rights claims and resist presidential encroachment. Marie-Amélie
George has observed how bureaucratic actors, despite top-down policies restricting
the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals, worked to cement more protective policies and
practices.218 Similarly, in the immigration context, Joseph Landau has explored how
bureaucratic actors in the Obama administration worked creatively to implement
prosecutorial discretion initiatives by channeling feedback upwards from low-level
bureaucrats to mid- and top-level officials, allowing them to quickly innovate and
improve protections for immigrants.219
Bottom-up innovation clearly has some benefits.220 It allows bureaucratic
actors to marshal on-the-ground experience and make better decisions on individual
matters because they can weigh the unique facts before them. Bureaucrats also can
share lessons upwards to influence policymakers and tweak policies quickly.221 In
addition, bottom-up action can contribute to “administrative common law,” the
common corpus of law and policy within the administrative agency.222
However, there are drawbacks to bottom-up bureaucratic innovation. While
low-level bureaucrats can mobilize their knowledge and expertise to support policies
that protect minority rights, they can also support repressive policies and, without
effective executive oversight, can cause significant harm. As Landau acknowledges,
innovation by bureaucratic actors is not a “one-way ratchet.”223 Rather, it is capable
of “produc[ing] a set of very different, immigrant-unfriendly directives as opposed
to the current, more immigrant-affirming ones.”224 Indeed, the very same

218. George, supra note 216, at 84–85 (“[B]y the mid1980s many bureaucrats had become
incidental allies, subverting bans on gay and lesbian foster and adoptive parenting and promoting
gay-inclusive curricula in public schools.”).
219. Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic Administration: Experimentation and Immigration Law, 65
DUKE L.J. 1173 (2016) (arguing that this on-the-ground experimentation led to better results, as officers
could exercise discretion and engage in subregulatory guidance to improve initiatives quickly
and effectively).
220. I define “bottom-up” action as occurring when frontline workers, exercising the discretion
given to them by the agency and top-down directives, shape policies on the ground and then
communicate with mid- or top-level officials to create or impact policy.
221. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 215, at 268 (describing how bureaucratic actors are influenced by
extrabureaucratic actors, but they also can “act so as to influence the other actors”). As Landau points
out, low-level actors may, at times, favor subregulatory or nonlegislative rules of notice-and-comment
rulemaking, which although less transparent, can result in quicker, beneficial outcomes. Landau, supra
note 219, at 1232. He offers the example of bureaucratic action during the Obama administration to
issue subregulatory guidance on Deferred Action applications, a move that he argues ultimately
benefited immigration applicants. Id.
222. Landau, supra note 219, at 1233–34 (“Perhaps most significant is that frontline officers
can report the effectiveness of their experimentation up the chain of command and better enable
policymakers to make positive choices regarding ex ante and ex post controls across entire agencies or
even entire regulatory fields.”).
223. Id. at 1232.
224. Id.
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circumstances that can encourage innovation by low-level bureaucratic actors, can
fuel unlawful, harmful policies, especially without effective executive oversight.225
It is against this landscape that we view the shallow state. Under the Trump
administration, bureaucratic actors leveraged their expertise and experience to
restrict access to essential immigration benefits, ranging from asylum to T visas to
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).226 The T visa context is but one
example, but a particularly strident one. As President Trump publicly expressed his
deep commitment to trafficking victims, privately the administration oversaw the
systematic erosion of protections. It watched as administrative actors implemented
new policies to ensure that more T visa applications were rejected, delayed,
and denied.
D. Tactics of the Shallow State
“We’ve had the Trafficking Victims Protection Act since 2000. In those
[nineteen] years, an entire infrastructure has been constructed to support
trafficking survivors. And piece by piece, the Trump administration is
eroding and undermining that edifice of protection.”227
-Martina Vandenberg, Human Trafficking Legal Center
This Part examines the tactics of the shallow state in the T visa context. It
highlights the strategies used by bureaucratic actors, including (1) heightening the
stakes for immigrant victims, (2) rejecting new applications, (3) causing delay,
(4) increasing requests for evidence and denials, and (5) expanding “darkside
discretion.”228 This Part shows how these actions have worked in concert to
undermine the T visa program and harm immigrant victims of trafficking.
1. Heightened Stakes
In 2018, USCIS raised the stakes for all T visa applicants. Previously, if denied
a T visa, applicants were not placed in removal (deportation) proceedings.229 Thus,

225. Id. (arguing that under the Obama administration, the president exercised careful control
over low-level bureaucrats but warning that this oversight might not always be present).
226. See, e.g., Dystopian Fiction, supra note 45.
227. How Trump Is ‘Destroying Protections’ for Victims of Human Trafficking, WORLD
POL. REV. ( July 2, 2019), https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/27998/under-trumphuman-trafficking-protections-have-weakened [ https://perma.cc/PR9J-DG52 ].
228. See infra Section III.D.5.
229. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PM-602-0050.1,
UPDATED GUIDANCE FOR THE REFERRAL OF CASES AND ISSUANCE OF NOTICES TO APPEAR
(NTAS) IN CASES INVOLVING INADMISSIBLE AND DEPORTABLE ALIENS ( 2018),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-06-28-PM-602-0
050.1-Guidance-for-Referral-of-Cases-and-Issuance-of-NTA.pdf [ https://perma.cc/E3HH-L2KV ];
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 488 (2019), https://www.state.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/2019-Trafficking-in-Persons-Report.pdf [ https://perma.cc/R9G5-5E5F ]
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albeit undocumented, they could remain in the United States, unless subject to other
immigration enforcement actions or otherwise in removal proceedings. This policy,
in place for more than fifteen years, encouraged immigrant victims, often fearful of
deportation, to come forward and apply for immigration protection.
Under the Trump administration, in November 2018, USCIS quickly reversed
course. In a policy memorandum, USCIS announced that applicants whose T visa
applications were denied would be issued a Notice to Appear (NTA), the charging
document in immigration court, and placed in removal proceedings.230 This policy
change came amidst new guidance by Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), dramatically altering enforcement priorities and making clear that no
one, including an immigrant victim, was off the table in terms of
immigration enforcement.231
ICE, established by Congress in 2003, was historically the enforcement branch
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS),232 but this new guidance
effectively transformed USCIS, the benefit-granting arm of DHS, into an
enforcement agency.233 The policy had an immediate chilling effect.234 Applications

[ hereinafter 2019 TIP REPORT ] (“As of November 2018, DHS may issue NTAs to individuals
following the denial of a T visa or denial of adjustment of status from a T visa to permanent resident
status, if such individuals are unlawfully present at that time of denial.”).
230. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 229.
231. See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Thomas D. Homan, Acting Dir.,
U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Lori Scialabba, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., Joseph
B. Maher, Acting Gen. Couns., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Dimple Shah, Acting Assistant Sec’y for
Int’l Affs. & Chip Fulghum, Acting Undersecretary for Mgmt. re Implementing the President’s Border
Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements Policies (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-Security-Immigration
-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf [ https://perma.cc/FUA4-8S2C ] (expanding border security
and enforcement efforts); Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Thomas D. Homan, Acting Dir.,
U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Lori Scialabba, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., Joseph
B. Maher, Acting Gen. Couns., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Dimple Shah, Acting Assistant Sec’y for
Int’l Affs. & Chip Fulghum, Acting Undersecretary for Mgmt. re Enforcement of the Immigration
Laws to Serve the National Interest (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/TG47-GGGA ] (describing new policies to significantly expand immigration
enforcement priorities).
232. See supra note 91 regarding the agencies within the Department of Homeland Security.
233. See, e.g., Joshua Breisblatt, USCIS Is Slowly Being Morphed into an Immigration Enforcement
Agency, IMMIGR. IMPACT ( July 9, 2018), https://immigrationimpact.com/2018/07/09/uscisguidance-immigration-benefit/#.YLqD7TZKj-Z [ https://perma.cc/5U63-DHYY ] (characterizing
the NTA memo as a “major shift in how USCIS operates” because “USCIS was never meant to be
tasked with immigration enforcement”).
234. See, e.g., BETSY LAWRENCE & GREG CHEN, AM. IMMIGR. L. ASSOC., AILA POLICY
BRIEF: NEW USCIS NOTICE TO APPEAR GUIDANCE (2018) (“The new NTA policy will also have a
chilling effect on legal immigration in general, discouraging many people who are eligible for
immigration benefits from applying out of fear they will be subject to unjustified enforcement.”); see
also Dystopian Fiction, supra note 45 (“[Since then,] [a]pplications for the special visas have
nose-dived.”).
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for T visas decreased by twenty-three percent after its announcement.235 USCIS
began to issue NTAs and place applicants in removal proceedings.236 Martina
Vandenberg, founder of a national anti-trafficking NGO, called the risk of
deportation “a game-changer.”237 She noted that it “totally changes the analysis of
whether or not it’s worth it for any trafficking victim to cooperate with law
enforcement.”238 Deborah Pembrook, an advocate and trafficking survivor,
remarked about the risks faced by T visa applicants, “We hear time and time
again: Why would I risk myself? Why would I risk my family?”239
2. Rejection
As USCIS increased the risk of deportation, the agency simultaneously exerted
greater control over the entry point for new T visa applications. It did this by
strenuously policing the content and substance of T visa applications. In particular,
USCIS issued two new policies that increased the burden on initial T visa applicants.
One policy reduced access to fee waivers, and the other required that all blanks on
the application be filled. USCIS then began summarily to reject applications that
failed to meet these new requirements.240 Both policies are described below
at length.
Fee Waiver Policy. In 2018, USCIS abruptly tightened the qualifications for fee
waivers and increased the filing fees for certain applications associated with the T
visa.241 While the T visa itself does not require a fee, many applicants must submit

235. Contrera, supra note 11.
236. See Breisblatt, supra note 233 (describing how immediately following the issuance of the
NTA guidance, USCIS began issuing NTAs, whereas previously this was the duty of ICE).
237. See Gordon, supra note 35.
238. Id.
239. Contrera, supra note 11.
240. Due to a lack of transparency, the exact impact on T visa applicants is unknown. However,
USCIS has disclosed initial data in response to FOIA litigation to show that in the U visa context, there
was a dramatic increase in rejections. See infra notes 296-298.
241. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(l)(7); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC, PM-602-0011.1, FEE WAIVER GUIDELINES AS ESTABLISHED BY THE FINAL RULE
OF THE USCIS FEE SCHEDULE; REVISIONS TO A DJUDICATOR ’ S F IELD M ANUAL (AFM) CHAPTER
10.9, AFM UPDATE AD11-26 (2011), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/
memos/FeeWaiverGuidelines_Established_by_the_Final%20Rule_USCISFeeSchedule.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/TK2T-C8RP ] [ hereinafter FEE WAIVER GUIDELINES ] (describing eligibility criteria for fee
waiver requests, including evidence of very low-income). In the summer of 2018, “[n]umerous
practitioners . . . reported a significant increase in fee waiver denials from the Vermont Service Center
in . . . U visa . . . applications.” Letter from Cecelia Friedman Levin, Sr. Pol’y Couns., ASISTA, to
Maureen Dunn, Chief, Fam. Immigr. & Victim Prot. Div., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. ( July 30, 2018), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sq_CtrhuAiiKGayzsT9wQld
3ZglmFfFK/view [https://perma.cc/N8PQ-DPPN]; see, e.g., ASISTA, PRACTICE ADVISORY: FEE
WAIVERS FOR VAWA SELF-PETITIONS, U AND T VISA APPLICATIONS 1 (Aug. 2018), https://
asistahelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ASISTA-Practice-Advisory-Fee-Waivers.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/99LE-DDAB ] [ hereinafter ASISTA FEE WAIVERS ] (“Practitioners nationwide have recently
reported significant rates of fee-waiver denials from the Humanitarian Division of the Vermont Service
Center.”); IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., FEE WAIVERS AND THEIR IMPACT ON IMMIGRANT
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a “waiver of inadmissibility” with the T visa application.242 This waiver, as of
October 2021, requires a filing fee of $930.243 Many trafficking victims depended
heavily on fee waiver applications because they could not otherwise afford the
filing fee.
Since the TVPA was passed, USCIS has had a generous practice of granting
fee waivers to trafficking victims.244 T visa applicants could qualify for a fee waiver
by demonstrating that they received a means-tested benefit,245 had income less than
125% of the federal poverty guidelines, or faced financial hardship.246 As a result,
many victims submitted evidence of their income or receipt of public benefits
to qualify.
This policy changed significantly on September 27, 2018, when USCIS
announced changes to fee waiver practice. USCIS first reported plans to revise the

SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT, AND OTHER CRIMES 2 (2018), https://
www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/fee_waiver_report.pdf [ https://perma.cc/Z7Y2-XNVK ]
(“[In 2018,] [a]dvocates for survivors throughout the country reported high numbers of fee waiver
request rejections, in cases that clearly met established fee waiver eligibility criteria.”).
242. See ASISTA FEE WAIVERS, supra note 241; ASISTA, USCIS FEE RULE & THE IMPACT ON
SURVIVOR-BASED PROTECTIONS 3 (2020), https://asistahelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/
Fee-Rule-Survivor-Protections.pdf [ https://perma.cc/KJ94-5XHC ] (“VAWA self-petitioners, and U
and T visa applicants must often file ancillary forms that do have significant fees, which would
rise exponentially . . . .”).
243. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OMB NO. 16150017, INSTRUCTIONS FOR APPLICATION FOR ADVANCE PERMISSION TO ENTER AS A
NONIMMIGRANT (FORM I-192) (2019), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/
forms/i-192instr.pdf [ https://perma.cc/T7SJ-HM93 ].
244. ASISTA FEE WAIVERS, supra note 241, at 1 (citing Petition to Classify Alien as Immediate
Relative of a United States Citizen or as a Preference Immigrant; Self-Petitioning for Certain Battered
or Abused Spouses and Children, 61 Fed. Reg. 13061, 13069 (Mar. 26, 1996), https://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/FR-1996-03-26/pdf/96-7219.pdf [ https://perma.cc/9USL-KTJY ]; see also New
Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for ‘‘U’’ Nonimmigrant Status, 72
Fed. Reg. 53014, 53021 (Sept. 17, 2007), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2007-09-17/pdf/E717807.pdf [ https://perma.cc/45HJ-7JWN ]; Classification for Victims of Severe Forms of Trafficking
in Persons; Eligibility for “T” Nonimmigrant Status, 81 Fed. Reg 92266, 92288 (Dec. 19, 2016), https:/
/www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-12-19/pdf/2016-29900.pdf [ https://perma.cc/5AEW-WG6N ]
(discussing fee waiver history in T visa context). In 2008, Congress required that the Department of
Homeland Security allow certain applicants, including applicants for T visas, to qualify for fee waivers
in the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008. William
Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 201(d)(3), 122
Stat. 5044, 5054 (2008). By regulation, USCIS further specified that discretionary fee waivers are
available if the requestor cannot pay the fee and that such a waiver must be “consistent with the status
or benefit sought”—thus might not be appropriate if the underlying immigration benefit
requires that the immigrant demonstrate, for example, a “substantial financial investment.”
8 C.F.R. § 103.7(c)(1) (2020).
245. 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(c)(1) (2020).
246. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OMB NO. 16150116, INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUEST FOR FEE WAIVER (FORM I-912) 4–5 (2019), https://
www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/forms/i-912instr-pc.pdf [ https://perma.cc/L8BD79NW ] (describing the eligibility standards for USCIS fee waivers).
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fee waiver form—Form I-912, Request for Fee Waiver.247 The amendment
prohibited applicants who receive a means-tested benefit from qualifying for a fee
waiver.248 USCIS stated, in support of this policy, that “inconsistent income levels
[were] being used” by states to determine eligibility for means-tested benefits.249 At
the same time, USCIS shared plans to significantly raise the filing fees for
immigration applications, including the waiver of inadmissibility form used by T
visa applicants.
Advocates, lawyers, scholars, and activists raised significant concerns about
the changes.250 They warned that the rules would have dramatic implications by
significantly reducing application rates and increasing the burden on applicants.251
Several commentators noted that “the language runs counter to existing law” as
Congress explicitly exempted T visa applicants from fees.252 Others described how
the new fee guidance would make victims more vulnerable to abuse because they
will have to “turn to jobs with exploitative employers or back to traffickers” to pay
filing fees.253 USCIS, nevertheless, refused to change course and began
implementation of the policy.
In 2019, immigrant advocacy organizations filed three federal lawsuits
challenging the new fee waiver policy.254 Public Citizen, representing Northwest
Immigrant Rights Project, alleged that the new fee waiver form violated the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) due to its failure to undergo notice-and-

247. Proposed I-912 Fee Waiver Form Revision, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Sept. 27,
2018), https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/proposed-i-912-fee-waiver-form-revision
[ https:/
/perma.cc/QSK9-D8WV ].
248. ALLISON DAVENPORT, IMMIGR. LEGAL RES. CTR., FEE WAIVERS: STATUS OF
PROPOSED CHANGES 3 (2019), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/fee_waiver_
update-final-12.16.19.pdf [ https://perma.cc/ZDD3-CE9K ].
249. Agency Information Collection Activities; Revision of a Currently Approved
Collection: Request for Fee Waiver; Exemptions, 83 Fed. Reg. 49120, 49121 (Sept. 28, 2018).
250. See Agency Information Collection Activities; Revision of a Currently Approved
Collection: Request for Fee Waiver; Exemptions, 84 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26138 ( June 5, 2019) (providing
notice of what changes the agency was making); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Fee
Schedule and Changes to Certain Other Immigration Benefit Request Requirements, 85
Fed. Reg. 46788, 46794-889 (Aug. 3, 2020) (summarizing and responding to comments submitted
during notice-and-comment rulemaking process).
251. See Vasil Yasenov, Michael Hotard, Duncan Lawrence, Jens Hainmueller & David
D. Latin, Reducing Red Tape Allows More People to Become Citizens for Free, IMMIGR. POL’Y LAB,
https://immigrationlab.org/project/reducing-red-tape-allows-people-become-citizens-free/ [ https://
perma.cc/YUN2-576U ] ( last visited Dec. 19, 2020 ) (forecasting decrease by 10 percent of
citizenship applications).
252. See 85 Fed. Reg. at 46810.
253. Id. at 46816.
254. See City of Seattle v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:19-CV-07151-MMC
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2019); Nw. Immigrant Rts. Project v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 496
F. Supp. 3d 31 (D.D.C. 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-5369, 2021 WL 161666 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 2021);
Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief of the City of Boston, 34 Additional Cities, Counties and
Municipal Agencies, and U.S. Conference of Mayors in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, Project Citizenship v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:20-cv-11545-NMG
(D. Mass. Sept. 17, 2020).
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comment rulemaking.255 Plaintiffs further asserted that the new fee waiver guidance
was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA and violated provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.256 On October 8, 2020, the federal court ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs, granting plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and
issuing a national injunction, staying the implementation of the rule.257 The court
found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the rule was
arbitrary and capricious under the APA.258 As a result of the injunction, USCIS
stopped applying the new fee waiver guidance.259 This outcome provided a
temporary win for immigrant applicants and their advocates.
“No Spaces” Policy. However, within weeks of the national injunction, USCIS
took new action.260 It issued a new, simple online alert:261 effective immediately,
USCIS would reject all applications that had a blank field, even if the field was not
applicable.262 This “no spaces” policy required that all blank fields be completed
with “N/A” or “None.” As justification, USCIS cited federal regulations that
require that “applications filed with USCIS must be properly completed, submitted,
and executed in accordance with the applicable form instructions.”263
Advocates decried the policy as disastrous for immigrant victims.264 Some
argued that the policy was colored by bad intent, transforming immigration forms
into “minefields, intentionally designed to entrap the unsuspecting.”265 Others

255. Complaint, Nw. Immigrant Rts. Project v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 496
F. Supp. 3d 31 (D.D.C. 2020) (No. 19-3283).
256. Id.
257. Nw. Immigrant Rts. Project, 496 F. Supp. 3d at 75 (order granting preliminary injunction).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See Rampell, supra note 49 (“The policy change, at first affecting just asylum applicants,
was announced without fanfare on the USCIS website sometime in the fall.”). The “no spaces” policy
applied initially to asylum and U visa applications, then eventually to T visa applications. Id. USCIS also
extended the “no spaces” policy to law enforcement certifications, stating that certifying officials also
could not leave a field blank, or the entire T or U visa applications would be rejected. See Ombudsman
Alert: USCIS Publishes Alert for Form I-914, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (March 24, 2020, 9:25
AM),
https://www.dhs.gov/blog/2020/03/24/ombudsman-alert-uscis-publishes-alert-form-i-914
[ https://perma.cc/DA38-RBWN ] [ hereinafter T VISA USCIS ALERT ].
261. Rampell, supra note 49.
262. Id.
263. Application for T Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://
www.uscis.gov/i-914 [ https://web.archive.org/web/20210424185120/https://www.uscis.gov/i-914 ]
(Apr. 5, 2021); see 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1), (b)(1) (2011). In particular, in guidance posted on the USCIS
website, “you must provide a response to all required questions, even if the response is ‘none,’
‘unknown,’ or ‘n/a.’” T VISA USCIS ALERT, supra note 261. The guidance noted that applications for
T visas will be rejected “that has, for example, an empty field for gender, other names used, marital
status, current immigration status, information about a spouse or child, or tables not completed where
appropriate.” Id.
264. See, e.g., Charles Davis, Bureaucracy as a Weapon: How the Trump Administration is Slowing
Asylum Cases, GUARDIAN (Dec. 23, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/
dec/23/us-immigration-trump-asylum-seekers [ https://perma.cc/A9WK-NUZW ] (describing how
the new “no spaces” policy had a devastating impact on asylum applicants).
265. See Dystopian Fiction, supra note 45.
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asserted that the “no spaces” policy lacked a cogent policy rationale and would harm
the most vulnerable by immediately (and with little notice) rejecting their
applications.266 USCIS, however, maintained that the policy was consistent with its
authority to determine what constituted a “completed” application and moved
forward to implement it.
For months, USCIS rejected immigration applications. The direct impact on
T visa applicants is still unknown. USCIS has yet to release statistics. However, in
our survey of 157 lawyers representing T visa applicants,267 52 practitioners
experienced at least one USCIS rejection since January 2016, and 9 of 52 (17.30%)
experienced one or more rejections due to the “no spaces policy.”268 This data
signals that some T visa applicants were impacted directly, while others were
indirectly affected by the anxiety and confusion caused by the policy.
Unlike the T visa context, the U visa context saw extensive rejections.269 In
the first three months of the policy, approximately ninety-eight percent of U visa
petitions were rejected within three months of the new “no spaces” policy.270 Within
nine months, almost 12,000 U visa petitions were returned.271 While such applicants

266. For example, on February 6, 2020, ASISTA, a national advocacy organization, described
the implications of the USCIS policy, noting that “this significant shift in policy and practice creates
enormous hardship for survivors and their families, and strains valuable resources for service
providers.” ASISTA, PRACTICE ADVISORY: USCIS FORM ALERT - BLANK SPACES ON FORM I-918,
PETITION FOR U NONIMMIGRANT STATUS 7 (2020), https://asistahelp.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/02/I-918-Practice-Alert-3.pdf [ https://perma.cc/K4MX-Y85N ] [ hereinafter ASISTA
PRACTICE ADVISORY ]; Letter from Cecelia Levin, Pol’y Dir., ASISTA, to Mark Koumans, Deputy
Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. & Michael Dougherty, CIS Ombudsman, Dep’t Homeland
Sec. (Feb 6, 2020), https://asistahelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ASISTA-Letter-on-I-918Alert-2.6.2020-7.pdf [ https://perma.cc/AP79-4QCT ] (noting how USCIS failed to provide “any
justification or rationale for this drastic and sudden change, which needlessly undermines a survivor’s
access to critical immigration benefits designed by a bipartisan majority in Congress for
their protection”).
267. In spring 2021, the author and Professor Heba Gowayed conducted a survey of 160
practitioners with experience representing T visa applicants. Practioners included lawyers, Board of
Immigration Appeals accredited representatives, and paralegals. The results of the survey are
forthcoming in a report to be released in 2022. Survey data is on file with author. The survey is part of
a larger mixed-methods research project, entitled “Securing a T Visa: An Exploration of Inequality in
Trafficking Protection,” funded by the Boston University Center for Antiracist Research. See 2021
Research & Policy Teams, BOSTON UNIV. CTR. FOR ANTIRACIST RSCH., https://www.bu.edu/
antiracism-center/antiracism-research/2021-research-policy-teams/ [ https://perma.cc/4LWA-88R8 ]
( last visited Oct. 10, 2021 ).
268. Id. Practitioners reported experiencing a rejection associated with either the T visa
application form (Form I-914) or other associated forms, like the waiver of inadmissibility (Form
I-192). Id.
269. AM. IMMIGR. L. ASS’N, ASISTA & URBAN JUST. CTR., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROJECT,
PRACTICE ADVISORY: INSIGHT INTO USCIS’S APPLICATION OF THE “NO-BLANKS” POLICY TO
U-VISA PETITIONS 2 (Nov. 23, 2020), https://asistahelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/NoBlanks-Practice-Advisory-11.20.20.pdf [ https://perma.cc/4SQM-TDD5 ] [ hereinafter AILA BLANK
SPACE PRACTICE ADVISORY ].
270. Id.
271. Id.
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could reapply, some missed significant filing deadlines; for others, it further delayed
their pursuit of protection.
On November 19, 2020, NGOs filed a federal lawsuit challenging the “no
spaces” policy.272 In Vangala v. USCIS, plaintiffs alleged that the “no spaces” policy
“led to absurd and unfairly prejudicial results.”273 Plaintiffs asserted the policy
violated the APA by failing to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking.274
Plaintiffs also argued that the agency’s actions were “arbitrary and capricious.”275
The litigation was eventually successful in prompting settlement negotiations with
USCIS.276 As a result, USCIS agreed to stop implementing the policy, beginning on
December 24, 2020.277 Then, on July 20, 2021, the U.S. District Court in the
Northern District of California granted final approval of a settlement agreement.278
Pursuant to the agreement, class members with rejected applications279 under the
“no spaces” policy were permitted resubmit their applications on or before July 20,
2022, and obtain a receipt notice reflecting their original filing date.280
3. Delay
As USCIS raised the bars to entry, the agency significantly slowed
adjudications for T visas. From 2015 to 2019, the processing times for decisions
increased from 7.99 months to 17.9 months.281 As of May 10, 2021, USCIS
estimated the processing time for T visas as seventeen months to twenty-nine
months.282 Delays meant that immigrant victims of trafficking, most without access
to employment authorization, had to survive and avoid deportation even longer
before receiving a T visa. They remained in legal limbo, without a clear promise
of protection.

272. Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 2, Vangala
v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 3:20-cv-08143 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2020).
273. Id. at 2.
274. Id. at 3.
275. Id. at 26.
276. Practice Alert: USCIS Agrees to Stop Rejecting Applications and Petitions for Blank Spaces
as of December 28, 2020, AM. IMMIGR. LAWS. ASS’N (Dec. 28, 2020), https://
www.aila.org/infonet/featured-issue-usciss-blank-space-policy [ https://perma.cc/B7YN-37MM ].
277. Id.
278. See Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement: Order, Vangala v. U.S. Citizenship
& Immigr. Servs., No. 4:20-cv-08143 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2021).
279. The agreement impacts individuals with the following types of forms, which were rejected
due to the “no spaces” policy: Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal;
Form I-918, Petition for U Nonimmigrant Status; and Form I-918 Supplement A, Petition for
Qualifying Family Member of U-1 Recipient. Settlement Agreement at 3–4, Vangala v. U.S. Citizenship
& Immigr. Servs., No. 4:20-cv-08143 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2021).
280. Id. at 5–8.
281. See chart on file with author based on analysis of U.S. Department of State Trafficking in
Persons Reports.
282. Check Case Processing Times, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://
egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/ [ https://perma.cc/SA8U-XRVV ] ( last visited Oct. 10, 2020 ).
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In a 2020 report to Congress, USCIS Ombudsman’s Office noted that
adjudication delays by USCIS were a “critical question.”283 The Office pointedly
asked USCIS to describe transparently how it was “managing benefits applications
from vulnerable populations (such as victims of human trafficking), where
prolonged waiting periods could potentially endanger the applicant’s safety.”284 As
the report noted, many trafficking victims risked losing access to time-limited
specialized case management services for trafficking survivors as the processing
times extended.285 Victims in removal proceedings found it more challenging to
obtain continuances and stave off a potential removal order. Some were even
removed. At the same time, many victims remained vulnerable to revictimization
and reprisals from traffickers.286 Thus, delays left many more vulnerable to abuse
and exploitation.
4. Narrow Misinterpretation
As T visa applicants faced delay and new risks of removal, USCIS issued more
denials and requests for evidence, as the agency rigidly interpreted existing
standards, often contrary to existing law and regulations.287 In the most strident
example, USCIS began to interpret the “on account of” requirement for the T visa
to establish a new de facto statute of limitations for applicants and to deny any
applicants who failed to meet this deadline. To qualify for a T visa, the applicant
must show that she is in the United States “on account” of the trafficking.288 This
ground requires that the victim demonstrate that they have been
physically present in the United States, American Samoa, or the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or at a port of entry
thereto, on account of such trafficking, including physical presence on
account of the alien having been allowed entry into the United States for
participation in investigative or judicial processes associated with an act or
a perpetrator of trafficking.289
283. OFF. OF THE CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. OMBUDSMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., ANNUAL REPORT 2020, at 8 (June 30, 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/20_0630_cisomb-2020-annual-report-to-congress.pdf [ https://perma.cc/9ZHU-HG9P ].
284. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., USCIS
RESPONSE TO THE CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES OMBUDSMAN’S 2020 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2020).
285. 2020 TIP REPORT, supra note 25, at 518 (“Advocates expressed concern with lengthy and
increasing T visa processing times, citing added vulnerabilities for survivors who lack legal status or
whose time-limited support services expire.”).
286. Id.
287. 2019 TIP REPORT, supra note 229, at 487 (“NGOs reported increased obstacles to
obtaining a T visa, noting a rising number of requests for additional evidence by adjudicators, including
requests that referred to outdated regulations, and called for improved training for adjudicators.”); 2020
TIP REPORT, supra note 25, at 518 (“Advocates again reported increased obstacles to obtaining a
T visa.”).
288. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101(a)(15), 66 Stat. 163, 167 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)).
289. § 101(a)(15) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(l)) (emphasis added).
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Whereas USCIS previously interpreted this requirement broadly, the agency
transformed this requirement into a de facto statute of limitations, denying
applications for survivors of trafficking who failed to report to law enforcement
and file their T visa application within a few years of escaping their
trafficking experience.290
USCIS historically interpreted the “on account of” requirement generously to
mean that the trafficking occurred in the United States and that the victim has not
departed from the United States since the trafficking occurred.291 However, in 2017,
USCIS, without notice or guidance, moved to dramatically narrow its interpretation
of the “on account of” ground.292 This troubling shift came after 2016 agency
regulations that decreased the burdens on applicants to meet the “on account of”
requirement. Previously, to meet the requirement, applicants had to show they had
no “clear chance to leave the United States, or an ‘opportunity to depart.’”293 The
regulations, however, eliminated this additional requirement, in recognition the
prior interpretation was “burdensome, vague, and may frustrate congressional
intent.”294 This change made it easier for applicants to meet the “on account
of” standard.295
Then, in 2017, without notice, USCIS unilaterally moved to restrict
interpretation of the “on account of” ground.296 The exact contours of this change
are unknown because USCIS failed publicly to acknowledge any interpretation shift
or to respond to the author’s Freedom of Information Act requests.297 However,

290. See Corie O’Rourke, Cory Sagduyu & Katherine Soltis, Present Yet Unprotected: USCIS’s
Misinterpretation of the T Visa’s Physical Presence Requirement and Failure to Protect Trafficking Survivors,
3 AILA L.J. 53, 54 (2021) (describing the de facto statute of limitations “despite the absence of any
explicit T visa filing deadline in the TVPA or federal regulations”).
291. 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(g) (2002).
292. See Gordon, supra note 35 (quoting Mercer Cauley, the immigration attorney representing
a victim whose T visa was denied, as saying: “They’re using a technicality to revictimize a victim”).
293. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(g)(2) (2012). Pursuant to this standard, USCIS may consider
“circumstances attributable to the trafficking in persons situation, such as trauma, injury, lack of
resources, or travel documents that have been seized by the traffickers.” Id.
294. Classification for Victims of Severe Forms of Trafficking in Persons; Eligibility for “T”
Nonimmigrant Status, 81 Fed. Reg. 92274 (Dec. 19, 2016) (“Commenters also opposed the requirement
that a victim who escaped the traffickers and remains in the United States must show he or she had no
clear chance to leave, asserting it is burdensome, vague, and may frustrate congressional intent to
protect victims.”). A number of these amendments responded to statutory changes in the TVPRA. See
Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101(a)(15), 66 Stat. 163, 167 (1952) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(II)) (establishing that immigrant victims who depart the
United States and re-enter related to the law enforcement investigation may still qualify for T visas).
295.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. at 167 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(II)). Also, those who left the United States but re-entered were prohibited
from meeting the “on account of” requirement, even if their re-entry was to assist law enforcement. Id.
296. See Complaint at 9, Doe v. Wolf, No. 3:20-cv-00481 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2020) (“In 2017,
without any formal announcement or rule-making process, Defendant USCIS started denying bona
fide T visa applications, like the applications denied above, claiming the applicant needs to prove that
the trafficking was the reason the applicant was still in the United States.”).
297. See FOIA requests on file with author.
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anti-trafficking advocates observed that in cases that would have “soared through,”
applicants instead received scathing requests for evidence, some of them pages
long.298 They observed that some requests by USCIS included ultra vires language,
contravening the regulations regarding the “on account of” requirement.299 For
example, some stated that the victim, in order to meet the “on account of”
requirement, must have been “recently” liberated by a law enforcement agency,
while regulations only note that the person has to be “liberated by” such an agency
and include no such time limit.300 Also, the USCIS Administrative Appeals Office,
the body that handles T visa appeals, saw a pronounced rise in appeals that
challenged the denial of T visa applicants due to the “on account
of” requirement.301
At least one plaintiff challenged the new “on account of” interpretations in
federal court.302 In August 2020, a T visa applicant, who was denied based on the
“on account of” ground, filed a federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina.303 The complaint alleged that the new USCIS
interpretation was ultra vires and violated notice-and-comment provisions of the
APA.304
The applicant, known only as “Jane Doe,” was recruited by a couple in
Georgia from Peru to work as a domestic worker.305 Eventually, she escaped, but it

298. How Trump Is ‘Destroying Protections’ for Victims of Human Trafficking, supra note 227
(statement of Martina Vandenberg) (“[R]equests for evidence are much more aggressive. Cases that, in
the past, might have soared through are now prompting multiple-page demands for
additional evidence”).
299. The change came absent any statutory authority for a filing deadline. While adult
trafficking survivors victimized prior to October 28, 2000, were required to file their T visa applications
before January 31, 2003, this filing deadline was eliminated by USCIS via regulation in 2017.
Classification for Victims of Severe Forms of Trafficking in Persons; Eligibility for “T” Nonimmigrant
Status, 81 Fed. Reg 92266, 92301–02 (Dec. 19, 2016). Even when this filing deadline existed, Congress
carved out exceptions, including severe trauma that prevented the victim from applying, recognizing
the challenges faced by victims of trafficking. 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(d)(4) (2002).
300. See O’Rourke et al., supra note 290, at 58.
301. See id. at 54 (“Appeals to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) involving physical
presence rose sharply following this change in interpretation, amounting to nearly one-half of all T visa
appeals in 2020.”); Complaint at 8, Doe v. Wolf, No. 3:20-cv-00481 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2020) (“A
review of the AAO decisions concerning USCIS’ denial of T visas based on the presence ‘on account
of’ requirement shows an increase in appeals filed in 2019requesting [sic] de novo review of the agency’s
application of the law in this matter.”); see, e.g., Matter of E-T-M-, ID# 3385363 (AAO May 8, 2019)
(unpublished) (“AAO overturned USCISs denial and found that the Applicant’s continuous physical
presence was directly related to her past trafficking as described at 8 C.F.R. § 214.1 l(g)(l)(iv).”); Matter
of D-A-A-, ID# 2987735 (AAO Apr. 3, 2019) (unpublished) (finding that USCIS had erred in denying
the claim, noting that evidence that the applicant’s significant trauma, including “post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) relating to his trafficking,” “trichotillomania (hair-pulling disorder),” and “major
depressive disorder, severe, which interferes with his daily life” was sufficient to meet the “on account
of” standard).
302. See generally Complaint, supra note 296.
303. See id. at 9.
304. Id. at 4.
305. See Gordon, supra note 35.
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took her over ten years to come forward and apply for a T visa.306 In response,
USCIS denied her application in February 2020, claiming that she was no longer in
the United States “on account” of the trafficking.307 While the plaintiff eventually
withdrew the lawsuit,308 the agency has yet to publicly acknowledge a shift
in interpretation.
5. “Darkside Discretion”
USCIS also threatened to deliver another deadly blow for T visa applicants by
changing its standards on discretion in July 2020.309 These new discretion standards
imposed significant new burdens on applicants, above and beyond existing statutory
or regulatory requirements.310 The policy represented a dramatic shift from prior
guidance that encouraged adjudicators to look to case law and avoid “arbitrary” or
“inconsistent” decisions based on discretion.311 No such language was present in
new standards.
Congress intended for the T visa to be a nondiscretionary immigration
benefit.312 Thus, if an applicant meets the statutory requirements for the T visa,
USCIS must grant the benefit. Yet, T visa applicants are not free from the ambit of
discretion. Most T visa applicants trigger grounds of inadmissibility because they
entered without inspection, had a prior removal order, or engaged in commercial
sex, among other reasons.313 For this reason, they also must submit a waiver of
inadmissibility to receive the T visa. This waiver of inadmissibility, unlike the T visa,
is expressly discretionary and therefore governed by new guidance on discretion.314

306. Id.
307. See Complaint, supra note 296, at 6.
308. See Docket, Doe v. Wolf, No. 3:20-cv-00481 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2020). The author filed
two Freedom of Information Act requests with USCIS, dated August 7 and 21, 2020, and as of the date
of this writing, has not received a response (requests on file with author).
309. On July 15, 2020, USCIS published discretion guidance impacting a variety of immigration
applications at USCIS-PM E.8. Policy Manual: Chapter 8 – Discretionary Analysis, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-1-part-e-chapter-8 [ https://
perma.cc/8PYW-HMKF ]. See also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
PA-2020-10, POLICY ALERT: APPLYING DISCRETION IN USCIS ADJUDICATION (2020) [ hereinafter
2020 USCIS DISCRETION GUIDANCE ], https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/
policy-manual-updates/20200715-Discretion.pdf [ https://perma.cc/3YV9-KFY5 ].
310. See Peggy Gleason, USCIS Policy Manual Makes Sweeping Changes to Discretion,
IMMIGR. LEGAL RES. CTR. (2021), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/
sweeping_changes_in_uscis_policy_manual_for_discretion_3.19.21.pdf [ https://perma.cc/D7MBQTPA ] (“The changes represent an attempt to impose new substantive eligibility requirements on
applicants that do not exist in the governing statutes or regulations.”).
311. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL § 10.15 (AFM)
10.15 (“Like an exercise of discretion, a subjective consideration of facts does not mean the decision
can be arbitrary, inconsistent or dependent upon intangible or imagined circumstance.”).
312. A non-discretionary benefit is one for which USCIS must grant if the applicant meets the
statutory requirements.
313. See generally 8 U.S.C. §1182(a) for inadmissibility grounds.
314. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.4(c)(1)(viii) (2011).
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Also, the denial of the waiver is not subject to appeal, and thus, the stakes for
applicants are high.
Scholars have long critiqued the role of discretion in immigration cases.315
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, for example, coined the term “darkside discretion” to
refer “to a situation where the noncitizen satisfies the statutory criteria set by
Congress to be eligible for a remedy, but is denied by an adjudicator unfairly in the
exercise of discretion.”316 She argued that because discretion can be misused, its
exercise should “center on humanitarian concerns and be informed by
compassion;” thus, she argues that discretion as a general matter should be
“exercised favorably toward the noncitizen” rather than being designed as a
mechanism to deny or deter otherwise eligible applicants.317
USCIS’s new changes to the Adjudicator’s Field Manual makes the exercise of
discretion by adjudicators substantially more complicated.318 It increases the
burdens on applicants,319 by establishing a new, twenty-two-factor test for every
discretionary decision.320 Every file must contain a record of the officer’s
deliberations, including the weight given to each factor.321 There is no mention of
centering humanitarian concerns or exercising discretion favorably for
crime victims.322
Advocates described the policy as “USCIS’s latest attempt to leverage
bureaucracy to limit access to protections.”323 In a comment from seventy-nine
organizations serving immigrant survivors, they expressed “deep[ ] concern[ ] about
the myriad ways this guidance will foreclose such survivors from the humanitarian
relief that Congress specifically created for them, putting them at risk of continued
harm.”324 The new guidance also contradicted recent regulations, issued in 2016,

315. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Darkside Discretion in Immigration Cases, 72
ADMIN. L. REV. 367, 369 (2020).
316. Id.
317. Id. at 367–68.
318. 2020 USCIS DISCRETION GUIDANCE, supra note 309.
319. Id.
320. Id. The policy made clear that “[f]or benefits involving discretion, a discretionary analysis
is a separate component of the adjudication of the benefit request; it is typically assessed at the end of
the review, after an officer has determined that the requestor meets all other applicable eligibility
requirements.” Id. at 1.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323.
Letter from 79 Organizations on Behalf of Immigrant Survivors of Domestic Violence,
Sexual Assault, Human Trafficking and Other Abuses, to Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, Senior Off.
Performing the Duties of the Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (Aug. 14, 2020), https://
umdsafecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Joint-Comment-USCIS-Policy-Manual-USCISPolicy-Manual-Applying-Discretion-in-USCIS-Adjudications-1-USCIS-PM-E.8-and-10-USCIS-PM-A.
5-Aug.-14-2020.pdf [ https://perma.cc/NYD7-LU7M ].
324. Id. Advocates described how the new discretion policy ran counter to congressional intent
because Congress “aim[ed] to spare survivors from being forced to choose between living with abuse
and facing deportation and possible separation from their children.” Id. at 2. Significantly, commenters
argued that the discretion policy “undercut[s]” this desire “by creating additional documentary
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wherein DHS “acknowledge[d] that victims of trafficking in persons are an
especially vulnerable population.”325 Advocates pleaded that USCIS should
consider the unique circumstances of victims when deciding waiver applications and
argued that new guidance does not go far enough.326
Advocates pointed to the fact that trafficking victims often trigger negative
discretionary factors by virtue of their victimization, and the new policy provides
no exceptions for victims. The policy requires that adjudicators take account of
factors like “evidence regarding respect for law and order, good character, and the
intent to hold family responsibilities.”327 The guidance further provides no
exceptions for victims of trafficking or other populations who may, by virtue of
their victimization, be less able to demonstrate “good character.” Some trafficking
victims also have criminal histories related to their victimization. Yet, the policy
does not articulate exceptions related to crime victim status. Similarly, the policy
asks adjudicators to consider the “applicant or beneficiary’s value and service to the
community,”328 without noting how victims, especially those who have been
isolated or fearful, may have difficulty proving community engagement. For these
reasons, advocates have argued that the new discretion policy will significantly
impact discretionary adjudications and lead to new denials. In denied cases,
applicants will ultimately find themselves with no opportunity to appeal and unable
to access the T visa.
III. CONSTRAINTS ON THE SHALLOW STATE
The USCIS tactics described above were remarkably effective at slowing and
impeding the T visa application process. T visa applicants faced longer wait times;
their applications had a greater risk of rejection. Applicants were more likely to
receive requests for evidence and denials as USCIS applied a new de facto statute
of limitations. Some applicants were placed in removal proceedings, while others
were deported. Apart from these direct consequences, the policies and practices at
USCIS injected great uncertainty in the T visa process. As word got out, it had a
chilling impact, discouraging new applicants from coming forward to apply
for protection.
In light of these changes, the federal courts, at times, functioned as an effective
constraint on unlawful administrative action. Judicial review exposed some USCIS
policies as unlawful, provided redress for harmed applicants, and in some cases,
stopped the practice altogether. In the context of the fee waiver policy, for example,
federal litigation resulted in a national injunction, which temporarily halted the
requirements based on overbroad discretionary factors and by imposing requirements outside the
statutory framework for survivor-based cases.” Id.
325. See Classification for Victims of Severe Forms of Trafficking in Persons; Eligibility for
“T” Nonimmigrant Status, 81 Fed. Reg. 92284 (Dec. 19, 2016).
326. Id.
327. See Policy Manual: Chapter 8 – Discretionary Analysis, supra note 309.
328. Id. at 7.
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practice and allowed applicants to receive needed fee waivers.329 Similarly, as
plaintiffs challenged the “no spaces” policy, USCIS eventually entered into a
settlement, stopping the implementation of the policy and providing a pathway to
address those harmed.330
Federal litigation, however, was also an imperfect remedy. It took time. It
required immigrant victims to have access to pro bono legal representation, which
was not always available. Meanwhile, some applicants faced harsh consequences.
Some applicants were placed in removal proceedings; others were ordered
removed.331 For those, access to legal representation were even more scarce and the
consequences tremendous. Once deported, applicants faced tremendous
vulnerability to trafficking and exploitation. At the same time, many applicants were
no longer eligible to pursue the T visa because they could not show they were in the
United States “on account of” the trafficking and left without avenues for redress.
Thus, judicial review was insufficient alone to fully address the harms of USCIS
action.
Ongoing gaps in protection remain, and swift action is still needed. President
Joe Biden immediately took steps in the right direction. On his first day in office,
DHS rescinded the June 2018 policy memorandum, which called for denied T visa
applicants to be placed in removal proceedings.332 USCIS then ended the “no
spaces” policy.333 Since then, USCIS has entered into a settlement agreement to
remedy class members impacted by the policy.334
Yet, additional efforts are required. USCIS must end unlawful interpretations
of the “on account of” interpretation and amend the new discretion policy to take
account of the lived realities of immigrant victims. USCIS should speed up the
adjudication of T visa applications. USCIS should improve oversight, training, and
public engagement to ensure that adjudicators apply the law fairly and invite
perspectives from survivors and advocates to ensure that applicants can effectively
navigate the T visa application process. In addition, individual remedies are essential
to counteract efforts by the shallow state and restore trust in the T visa program. In
particular, this Article recommends (1) an investigation by the DHS Office of
Inspector General (OIG), an independent body that can identify and address

329. See supra Section II.D.2.
330. Id.
331. O’Rourke et al., supra note 290, at 65 (“There have been reports of survivors with pending
T visa applications or appeals being removed from the United States.”).
332. See Memorandum from David Pekoske, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
Troy Miller, Senior Off. Performing the Duties of the Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Tae
Johnson, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Tracey Renaud, Senior Off. Performing the
Duties of the Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. & Karen Olick, Chief of Staff 5 ( Jan. 20, 2021).
333. USCIS Confirms Elimination of “Blank Space” Criteria, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGR. SERVS. (April 1, 2021), https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-confirms-eliminationof-blank-space-criteria [ https://perma.cc/2NZP-T5R9 ].
334. See Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement: Order, Vangala v. U.S. Citizenship
& Immigr. Servs., No. 4:20-cv-08143 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2021).

Clean Final Edit_Dahlstrom_V3.docx (Do Not Delete)

2021]

TRAFFICKING AND THE SHALLOW STATE

11/8/21 8:12 AM

107

mismanagement, fraud, and abuse in DHS operations; (2) additional agency
oversight by the Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman
(Ombudsman); (3) increased USCIS training, transparency, and engagement; and
(4) remedies for individuals harmed by unlawful USCIS policies.
DHS OIG Investigation. An October 2020 report to Congress urged
policymakers to investigate factors that contribute to the “underutilization” of the
T visa program.335 DHS OIG, should respond by conducting a complete, thorough
audit of the T visa application process.336 This audit process must evaluate why
applicants may fear applying for the T visa and any barriers that applicants face
during the application process. The audit should include a review of all
correspondence among USCIS officials regarding these new policies and guidance,
as well as interviews with USCIS officials and site visits with the USCIS Vermont
Service Center, the office where T visa applications are decided.
The audit should unearth any restrictive unlawful interpretations of T visa
requirements, such as the “on account of” standard. It should involve physical file
reviews to compare case file information to determine compliance with statutory
and regulatory guidance.337 At the conclusion of the investigation, OIG should
provide recommendations for improving the T visa application process and
addressing the lasting impact of past unlawful or inappropriate policies. The OIG
should report directly to Congress, which has the authority to address any obstacles
identified through legislation or other means.
Agency Oversight. The USCIS Ombudsman also has authority to engage in
oversight. The Ombudsman should identify any T visa applicants impacted by
unlawful policies and engage with USCIS to rectify such harms, especially of policies
deemed unlawful by federal courts. For example, if T visa applicants had
applications improperly rejected due to the fee waiver and “no spaces” policy, the
Ombudsman should move expeditiously to request that USCIS reinstate the initial
date of receipt of the application. This move will ensure that the rejection does not
delay the ultimate adjudication of their T visa application and will not impact the
eligibility of derivative family members.338
Furthermore, the Ombudsman should encourage applicants who have
received erroneous denials or requests for evidence to contact their office for

335. IMMIGRATION RELIEF FOR VICTIMS, supra note 54, at 12.
336. DHS is well-situated because it has the authority and experience engaging with USCIS
related to human trafficking. See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., OIG-16-17, ICE AND USCIS COULD IMPROVE DATA QUALITY AND EXCHANGE TO HELP
IDENTIFY POTENTIAL HUMAN TRAFFICKING CASES (2016), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/assets/Mgmt/2016/OIG-16-17-Jan16.pdf [ https://perma.cc/BC74-FHVG ] (conducting an
audit examining how Immigrant & Customs Enforcement and USCIS could “improve data quality and
exchange” to improve identification of trafficking cases).
337. Id. at 16.
338. For example, T visa applicants under twenty-one at time of filing may qualify to file
petitions for certain derivative family members, and thus, if the application is receipted after the
applicant’s twenty-first birthday, the applicant could lose eligibility to apply for certain family members.
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review. If the USCIS adjudicatory practice is unlawful, the Ombudsman should
advocate with USCIS to establish a pathway for applicants to refile or reopen their
cases with USCIS, while retaining the initial filing date. The Ombudsman also
should investigate whether there is evidence of gross misapplication of law. In such
cases, the Ombudsman already has the power expeditiously to intervene with
USCIS in individual cases and encourage that USCIS reopen such cases. Finally, the
Ombudsman should report any findings related to the T visa application process in
its annual report to Congress.
Increased USCIS Training, Transparency, and Engagement. In addition, USCIS
must improve training for adjudicators who decide T visa cases. Importantly, USCIS
should institute further specialized training to the adjudicators assigned to
adjudicating T visa claims. Currently, all T visa applications are decided by a
specialized unit at the Vermont Service Center. It is essential that officers receive
additional training on (1) existing statutory and regulatory requirements, including
the “on account of” requirement; (2) challenges that immigrant victims of
trafficking may face when gathering evidence; (3) the “any credible evidence”
requirement for immigrant victims applying for T visas; and (4) evolving federal
case law interpreting federal trafficking statutes. This regular, tailored training will
ensure that officers are equipped to make consistent, lawful decisions.
Moreover, USCIS should improve public transparency and accountability.
USCIS must engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking, as required by the APA
for all new policies, and provide stakeholders with an adequate opportunity to raise
concerns early in the process. USCIS also should respond in a timely manner to
Freedom of Information Act Requests filed to obtain USCIS policies, guidance, and
correspondence. In addition, the USCIS Vermont Service Center should increase
engagement with the public, including immigrant victims, stakeholders, and
advocates. USCIS should engage in regular, frequent stakeholder calls. In such calls,
USCIS should report regularly about data related to T visas, provide any updates in
policies and trends, and respond directly to concerns from the public. This
engagement will ensure that USCIS learns quickly if new policies negatively impact
T visa applicants and remedy them early.
Individual Remedies. Finally, it is essential that T visa applicants harmed by these
policies have available remedies. For those who successfully bring federal lawsuits,
a federal court may order relief to either individual(s) or class members harmed by
the policy.339 However, there may be other impacted immigrant victims, who are
difficult to identify.340 As a result, USCIS should consider affirmative ways to
identify any immigrant victims negatively impacted by unlawful practices and ensure

339. See supra Section II.D.2.
340. Krystin Roehl, Logan Schmidt & Hayne Yoon, The Shocking Lack of Due Process for
Immigrants, VERA INST. OF JUST. ( Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.vera.org/blog/target-2020/theshocking-lack-of-due-process-for-immigrants [ https://perma.cc/7BDD-9U8Q ] (describing the
profound lack of access to pro bono representation for immigrant victims).
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that they have effective remedies. USCIS should reinstate the initial filing date of
any applications that were rejected unlawfully by the fee waiver or “no spaces”
policy. Applicants harmed by the “on account of” interpretation, if found to be
unlawful, should be permitted to reopen their T visa applications and associated
waiver applications without cost. In addition, any erroneously denied T visa
applicants who were deported from the United States should be permitted to file a
motion to reopen with the Executive Office for Immigration Review based on
equitable tolling. Also, unlawfully denied T visa applicants with final orders of
removal should be granted an automatic stay of removal and be able to qualify for
a motion to reopen based on agency error.341 While exceptional measures, these
efforts are essential to remedy past harm and to reestablish trust in the T visa
program for decades to come.
CONCLUSION
On October 28, 2020, the Congressional Research Service issued a report to
members of Congress, asking policymakers to “look at factors that potentially
contribute to what some observers consider to be underutilization” of the T visa
program.342 It encouraged investigation of elements of the application process that
“impede victims from applying for T status or create difficulties for victims.”343 As
this Article has shown, policies of the shallow state have established new barriers in
the T visa process. These obstacles were diffuse and often hidden. They acted as
“minefields” to trap the vulnerable and expose them to greater risk of deportation.
The harms of shallow state cannot be undone swiftly. Recent USCIS policies
and actions have an enduring impact on applicants and the perceived legitimacy of
the T visa program. Future administrations must roll back unlawful policies. They
must examine what obstacles remain hidden within the T visa application process.
They must work to restore trust. They must remain vigilant to identify new barriers
faced by T visa applicants when accessing immigration relief. Only then will the T
visa endure as the viable, robust protection for immigrant victims of human
trafficking that Congress envisioned.

341. Equitable tolling is a concept that allows an applicant to file a motion to reopen after the
relevant statute of limitations if they did not discover the circumstances giving rise to the claim until
after the filing deadline has passed. If the agency engaged in an unlawful policy or interpretation that
resulted in the denial, the applicant should automatically qualify for a motion to reopen based on
equitable tolling.
342. See IMMIGRATION RELIEF FOR VICTIMS, supra note 54, at 12.
343. See id.
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